

Flexible Wages, Bargaining, and the Gender Gap


Barbara Biasi and Heather Sarsons

Appendix – For online publication only


Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures

Figure AI: Unconditional salaries of men and women

Panel A) by year




Panel B) by time to CBA expiration/extension



Note: The figure shows the unconditional salaries of male and female teachers by calendar year (Panel A) and relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$, Panel B). Shaded areas represent confidence intervals for the female-male difference in salaries.


Figure AII: Salaries of men and women, by time to expiration of CBAs




Note: The figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s^g in equation (2) in the paper, for g =female (solid line) and g =male (dashed line), and using CBA expiration dates (rather than extensions). All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AIII: Gender gap in salaries, by time to expiration/extension of CBAs and district type

Panel a) Baseline




Panel b) With gender-specific experience returns, for teachers with 3-4 years of experience and a master's degree




Note: The figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), estimated and shown separately for flexible-pay (FP) and seniority-pay (SP) districts. In the bottom panel, we further control for seniority and education fixed effects interacted with *Female_i*, and with an indicator for years following Y_j ; the plotted coefficients refer to teachers with 3 or 4 years of experience and a master's degree. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AIV: Conditional salaries of men and women, by experience

Panel A) Years before a CBA expiration. Seniority pay (left) and flexible pay (right)




Panel B) Years after a CBA expiration. Seniority pay (left) and flexible pay (right)




Note: The figure shows conditional salaries per years of experience, separately for males and females; the top panel uses data prior to (and including) 2011, the bottom panel uses data after the expiration of CBAs or their extensions. Conditional salaries are obtained as residuals of a regression of salaries on education, district, and teaching assignment fixed effects, alone and interacted with an indicator for years following CBA expirations and extensions, as well as year effects interacted by extension year dummies.

Figure AV: Gender gap in salaries, by time to expiration/extension of CBAs. Balanced panel




Note: The figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), obtained using a balanced panel. Teachers in this sample are working in Wisconsin public school districts three years before and three years after their district's extension date. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AVI: Gender gap in salaries, by time to expiration/extension of CBAs. Intent-to-treat estimates




Note: The figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), obtained assigning teachers to the district they taught in the year before Act 10 throughout the period of analysis. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AVII: Gender gap in salaries, by time to expiration/extension of CBAs. Controlling for extra duties (coaching a sports team)




Note: The figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3). The dashed series is obtained excluding teachers who serve as sports coaches. The dotted series is obtained further controlling for an indicator for *coach* interacted with an indicator for years following a CBA expiration. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AVIII: Share of women: Survey sample vs. population




Note: Share of female teachers in the survey sample and in the population in 2016. Spikes represent confidence intervals for the difference in mean shares across the two groups. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AIX: Age distribution: survey sample vs. population




Note: Share of teachers in each age group, in the survey sample and in the population in 2016. Spikes represent confidence intervals for the difference in mean shares across the two groups.

Figure AX: Mobility rates, men and women



Note: Share of teachers who change district (with district-clustered confidence intervals) by time-to-expiration of a district's CBA or its extension. Rates are shown separately for men and women.


Figure AXI: Conditional salaries around a district move




Note: This figure shows OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals from estimating an event study of conditional salaries around each move, separately for male and female teachers. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AXII: Switches across teaching posts, by gender

Panel A) Share of teachers who switch teaching post, by gender




Panel B) Share of teachers who switch from a tested to a non-tested post, by gender




Note: The top panel shows the share of teachers who switch teaching position (i.e., grade or subject), by time-to-CBA expiration and gender. The bottom panel shows the share of teachers who switch from a tested to a non-tested post, by time-to-CBA expiration and gender. Shaded areas represent confidence intervals for the female-male difference in the shares.

Figure AXIII: Gender gap in salaries, for elementary vs high-school teachers




Note: OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), estimated separately for teachers in elementary school (solid line) and in high school (dashed line). All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AXIV: Gender gap in salaries, by share of men in the school




Note: OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), estimated separately for teachers in schools in the top quartile of the share of men (i.e., with more than 30 percent of men, solid line), and teachers in all other schools (dashed line). All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AXV: Gender gap in salaries, by share of boys in school



Note: OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), estimated separately for teachers in schools in the top and bottom 5 percent of the share of boys. “Baseline” refers to the gap estimated on all schools. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure AXVI: Gender gap in salaries, controlling for the share of boys in the school



Note: OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the coefficients δ_s in equation (3), controlling for the share of boys in each school (alone and interacted with an indicator for years after a CBA expiration). “Baseline” refers to the gap estimated on all schools. All coefficients are plotted relative to the year a CBA or its extension expired ($t = 0$). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table AI: Gender gap in salaries, Prior to a CBA expiration/extension

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.0087** (0.0037)	-0.0055*** (0.0015)	-0.0046*** (0.0013)	-0.0015 (0.0010)	-0.0011 (0.0010)
Distr and year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Experience FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Teaching assignm	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Subject	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	307525	307522	307355	307355	307355
# districts	428	428	428	428	428

Note: The table shows how the pre-Act 10 gender salary gap changes as we control for observable characteristics that enter districts' salary schedules. Estimates are obtained using data on years prior to each district's CBA expiration. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of salary per year, in full-time equivalency units. The variable *Female* equals one for female workers. All specifications include district and year fixed effects; columns 2-5 include years of experience fixed effects, columns 3-5 include fixed effects for the highest education degree, columns 4-5 include fixed effects for the school level (elementary, middle, high school), and column 5 includes fixed effects for subjects taught. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Table AII: Gender salary gap after a CBA expiration/extension: Robustness checks

	Balanced (1)	Teacher FE (2)	ITT (3)	Distr-spec schedule (4)
Female	-0.0007 (0.0010)	0.0016 (0.0050)	-0.0011 (0.0010)	-0.0007 (0.0010)
Female \times Post Extension	-0.0043*** (0.0012)	-0.0047*** (0.0012)	-0.0060*** (0.0012)	-0.0067*** (0.0012)
Distr \times Post exp	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Educ, Exper, Teaching Assign \times Post exp	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yr \times Exp yr	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	327687	569111	490644	576135
# districts	428	428	428	428

Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of salary per year, in full-time equivalency units. The variable *Female* equals one for female workers, the variable *Post Extension* equals one for years following the expiration of a CBA or its extension. All specifications include fixed effects for the district, number of years of seniority, highest education degree, grade level (elementary, middle, high), and subject (math, reading, and others), alone and interacted with an indicator for years after the extension of a CBA. Column 1 is estimated on a balanced sample of teachers in the 3 years before and after each expiration; column 2 includes teacher fixed effects; column 3 assigns teachers to the districts where they were teaching in 2011; and column 4 controls for indicators for years of experience and highest education degree, interacted with district fixed effects and for an indicator for years after the extension of a CBA. All specifications also include year fixed effects interacted with expiration and extension year effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Table AIII: Differences in school district characteristics by gender of schools' and districts' management

	Principal (school level)			Superintendent (district level)		
	Female	Male	Diff.	Female	Male	Diff.
Female	0.8	0.7	0.09*** (0.008)	0.7	0.7	0.02** (0.009)
Black	0.02	0.01	0.01*** (0.003)	0.003	0.002	0.001 (0.001)
Salary (\$)	53230.3	52485.3	745.0*** (281.9)	52083.7	50624.5	1459.1** (681.8)
Value-added	-0.002	-0.002	-0.00002 (0.002)	-0.001	-0.002	0.001 (0.002)
Cross-district mover	0.01	0.02	-0.003 (0.002)	0.02	0.02	-0.002 (0.007)
Leaves sample	0.09	0.09	-0.002 (0.004)	0.09	0.10	-0.004 (0.006)

Note: The table shows average characteristics, measured in 2011, of schools (left panel, "Principals") and districts (right panel "Superintendent") by the gender of the management. Columns 1-3 show average school characteristics by principal gender and a t-test of differences by principal gender (one observation is a school). Columns 4-6 show average district characteristics by superintendent gender and a t-test of differences by superintendent gender (one observation is a district).

Table AIV: Differences between districts represented vs not represented in the survey

	Represented	Not Represented	Diff.
Student enrollment	2208.3	1828.7	379.5 (438.9)
Male superintendent	0.8	0.8	-0.01 (0.03)
Salary (\$)	50145.5	49046.0	1099.5** (489.5)
Nr teachers	126.3	125.3	1.0 (26.5)
Flexible pay	0.5	0.4	0.03 (0.07)

Note: The table shows the characteristics of districts that are and are not represented in the survey. Districts that are represented (column 1) are those with at least one survey respondent. Districts that are not represented (column 2) had no respondents. All variables are averages measured across years.

Table AV: Survey answers: Likelihood of negotiating, OLS estimates. No controls

Panel A) Ever negotiated with:					
	Previous employer	Current empl., at start	Current empl, after start		
Female	0.090*** (0.020)	0.085*** (0.021)	0.043** (0.019)		
N	2836	2836	2836		
Y mean, males	0.295	0.223	0.205		

Panel B) Negotiated successfully conditional on negotiating, with:					
	Previous employer	Current empl., at start	Current empl., after start		
Female	0.080*** (0.028)	0.080*** (0.028)	0.106* (0.056)		
N	902	902	614		
Y mean, males	0.819	0.709	0.455		

Panel C) Reasons for not negotiating (current employer, at start)					
	Not possible	Not comfortable	Useless	Fear backlash	Satisfied w/pay
Female	0.028 (0.027)	-0.083*** (0.029)	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.051** (0.021)
N	2222	2222	2222	2222	2222
Y mean, males	0.525	0.280	0.233	0.132	0.147

Panel D) Likelihood of negotiating in the future, over:			
	Salary	Classroom assignment	Non-teaching duties
Female	0.563*** (0.165)	-0.271* (0.148)	0.160 (0.131)
N	2836	2836	2836
Y mean, males	3.365	4.752	4.347

Note: In panel A the dependent variable equals one if a teacher negotiated their salary with the previous employer (column 1), with the current employer at the start of the work relationship (column 2) or after the start (column 3). In panel B the dependent variable equals one if a teacher believed the negotiation with either the previous employer (column 1), her current employer at the start of the work relationship (column 2), or the current employer after the start of the work relationship (column 3) was successful, conditional on negotiating. In panel C the dependent variable equals one if a teacher gives the corresponding reason as a motive for not negotiating (conditional on not doing so). In panel D the dependent variable equals one if the teacher plans on negotiating either salaries (column 1), classroom assignment (column 2), or non-teaching duties (column 3) in the future. *Female* is an indicator for female teachers. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Table AVI: Survey answers, people skills, knowledge of colleagues' salaries, and confidence. OLS estimates, no controls

	Neg. beginning (1)	Neg. after (2)	Neg. future (3)	Successful neg (4)	Not confident (5)
[1em] Female	0.077*** (0.025)	0.026 (0.020)	0.383** (0.162)	0.105** (0.042)	-0.112*** (0.021)
Knows colleague pay	0.012 (0.020)	0.076*** (0.022)	-0.105 (0.156)	0.071* (0.041)	-0.126*** (0.019)
Female × knows colleague pay	0.001 (0.041)	0.006 (0.036)	0.335 (0.262)	-0.005 (0.070)	0.033 (0.029)
[1em] Female	0.151** (0.076)	0.063 (0.076)	0.914* (0.494)	0.190 (0.184)	-0.200** (0.079)
Female × People skills	-0.074 (0.081)	-0.025 (0.077)	-0.415 (0.497)	-0.084 (0.190)	0.088 (0.079)
People skills	0.102** (0.040)	0.050 (0.043)	0.499** (0.250)	0.039 (0.159)	-0.162*** (0.061)
[1em] Female	-0.005 (0.037)	0.046 (0.043)	0.672** (0.320)	0.225*** (0.086)	-0.130*** (0.045)
Confident talking	0.097*** (0.021)	0.062*** (0.020)	0.380*** (0.135)	0.008 (0.060)	-0.141*** (0.023)
Female × Confident talking	0.083* (0.043)	-0.017 (0.048)	-0.231 (0.333)	-0.122 (0.090)	0.037 (0.046)
[1em] Female	0.088 (0.062)	-0.028 (0.057)	0.307 (0.459)	0.111 (0.129)	-0.230*** (0.056)
Understand feelings	0.058 (0.036)	0.034 (0.034)	-0.131 (0.261)	-0.018 (0.095)	-0.078* (0.042)
Female × Understand feelings	-0.010 (0.063)	0.073 (0.060)	0.219 (0.488)	0.001 (0.131)	0.127** (0.058)
[1em] Female	0.093*** (0.033)	0.019 (0.023)	0.577*** (0.184)	0.110** (0.055)	-0.151*** (0.027)
Perf > avg	0.039** (0.018)	0.093*** (0.016)	-0.009 (0.117)	-0.023 (0.047)	-0.083*** (0.019)
Female × Perf > avg	-0.023 (0.040)	0.038 (0.033)	-0.112 (0.249)	-0.004 (0.071)	0.059* (0.033)
N	2810	2809	2801	701	2810
Y mean, males	0.223	0.205	3.365	0.709	0.233

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a teacher negotiated with the current employer at the beginning or after the start of the work relationship (columns 1, 2, respectively); whether the teacher plans to negotiate pay in the future (column 3); whether past negotiations were successful (column 4); and whether a teacher did not negotiate in the past because she did not feel comfortable doing so (column 5). Each column and panel is a separate regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Table AVII: Gender differences in mobility, by type of district and value-added

	Move to FP			Move to SP		
	(1) All teachers	(2) High VA	(3) Low VA	(4) All teachers	(5) High VA	(6) Low VA
Female	-0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0012 (0.0011)	-0.0009 (0.0012)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0017 (0.0012)
Post Extension	-0.0025** (0.0011)	-0.0032 (0.0025)	-0.0029 (0.0034)	-0.0013 (0.0013)	-0.0025 (0.0038)	-0.0027 (0.0033)
Female × Post Extension	-0.0015** (0.0007)	-0.0035 (0.0027)	-0.0016 (0.0028)	-0.0012 (0.0008)	0.0023 (0.0023)	-0.0001 (0.0027)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Experience, education FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	430916	48789	51358	430916	48789	51358
# districts	224	222	221	224	222	221
Mean of dep. var.	0.0116	0.0110	0.0132	0.0112	0.0104	0.0108

	Move from FP			Move from SP		
	(1) All teachers	(2) High VA	(3) Low VA	(4) All teachers	(5) High VA	(6) Low VA
Female	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0011)	0.0004 (0.0009)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0011)	-0.0006 (0.0012)
Post Extension	-0.0027*** (0.0009)	-0.0040 (0.0029)	-0.0109*** (0.0026)	-0.0008 (0.0011)	0.0019 (0.0033)	0.0029 (0.0038)
Female × Post Extension	-0.0000 (0.0007)	-0.0011 (0.0023)	0.0051*** (0.0020)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0028)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Experience, education FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	430310	48629	51179	430310	48629	51179
# districts	411	257	263	411	257	263
Mean of dep. var.	0.0096	0.0077	0.0079	0.0118	0.0094	0.0123

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for a teacher moving to a flexible-pay district (panel a, columns 1-3), to a seniority-pay district (panel a, columns 4-6), out of a flexible-pay district (panel b, columns 1-3), and out of a seniority-pay district (panel b, columns 4-6), and separately for all teachers (columns 1 ad 4), teachers with value-added above the median (“High VA”, columns 2 and 5), and teachers with value-added below the median (“Low VA”, columns 3 and 6). The variable *Female* equals one for female teachers and the variable *Post Extension* equals one for years following the expiration of a CBA or its extension. All columns 2-5 include district and year fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for years of experience and for the highest education degree. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Table AVIII: Outside options and the gender gap in salaries

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-0.0041*** (0.0012)	-0.0041** (0.0016)	-0.0011 (0.0016)
Female × Num Schools	0.0000 (0.0000)		
Post Ext	-0.0116*** (0.0036)	-0.0123*** (0.0042)	-0.0127*** (0.0036)
Female × Post Extension	-0.0019 (0.0015)	-0.0046** (0.0018)	-0.0002 (0.0020)
Female × Post Ext × Num Schools	-0.0000 (0.0000)		
Female × Num High Schools		0.0000 (0.0000)	
Female × Post Ext × Num High Schools		-0.0000 (0.0000)	
Female × Num Elem Schools			0.0001 (0.0000)
Female × Post Ext × Num Elem Schools			-0.0001 (0.0001)
Distr × Post exp	Yes	Yes	Yes
Educ, Exper, Teaching Assign × Post exp	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yr × Exp yr	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	579331	184060	247500
# districts	428	382	417

Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of salary per year, in full-time equivalency units. The variable *Female* equals one for female workers, the variable *Post Ext* equals one for years following the expiration of a CBA or its extension. The variable *Num.Schools* is the number of schools in a teacher's commuting zone. In column 2, *NumHighSchools* is the number of high schools in a teacher's commuting zone and the sample is restricted to high school teachers. In column 3, *NumElemSchools* is the number of elementary schools in a teacher's commuting zone and the sample is restricted to elementary school teachers. All specifications include fixed effects for the district, number of years of seniority, highest education degree, grade level (elementary, middle, high), and subject (math, reading, and others), alone and interacted with an indicator for years after the extension of a CBA. All specifications also include year fixed effects interacted with expiration and extension year effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. * ≤ 0.1 , ** ≤ 0.05 , *** ≤ 0.01 .

Appendix B Survey Details

Survey Questionnaire

General Questions

1. What is your age? (select one)
 - less than 25
 - 25-30
 - 31-35
 - 36-40
 - 41-45
 - 46-50
 - 51-55
 - over 55
2. What is your gender?
 - Male
 - Female
 - Other
3. Did you work in another industry before teaching in public schools?
 - Yes
 - No
4. Did you work in another industry before teaching in public schools?
 - Yes
 - No
5. Which industry did you work in before teaching in public schools?
 - Other job in public sector
 - Other job in private education
 - Other job in different sector

Negotiation

6. Have you ever negotiated your pay with any of your past employers?
 - Yes, successfully
 - Yes, unsuccessfully
 - No, it was not a possibility
 - No, it was a possibility but I chose not to
 - No, it was a possibility but I did not feel I could negotiate without repercussions
7. When you started your current job, did you negotiate your pay?
 - Yes, successfully

- Yes, unsuccessfully
 - No
8. Why didn't you negotiate your pay? [choose all that apply]
- It was not a possibility
 - I would not have gotten anything out of it I was worried about backlash
 - I didn't feel comfortable negotiating
 - I was satisfied with my offered salary
 - I did not know that I could negotiate
9. Since starting your current job, have you ever asked for a pay increase?
- Yes, successfully
 - Yes, unsuccessfully
 - No
10. Why haven't you asked for a pay increase? [choose all that apply]
- I would not have gotten anything out of it It is not a possibility
 - I am worried about backlash
 - I don't feel comfortable asking
 - I am satisfied with my salary
11. How likely is it that you will negotiate any of the following in the future? [for each item, choose a number from 1 (not at all likely) and 10 (very likely)]
- Salary
 - Classroom assignment
 - Non-teaching duties
12. Do you know what your colleagues earn?
- Yes
 - Only some of them
 - No
13. Do you know any public sector teachers who have negotiated their salary?
- Yes, among my colleagues
 - Yes, outside of my colleagues
 - Yes, both among and outside of my colleagues
 - No
14. How would you rate your performance relative to your colleagues' performance?
- Below average
 - Average
 - Above average
15. Are you confident about talking to people you don't know?

- Yes
- No

Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.

16. I pick up the subtle signals of feelings from another person.

- Agree
- Disagree

17. I am astute at reading people's reactions and feelings.

- Agree
- Disagree

18. I have good people skills.

- Agree
- Disagree

Figure BI: Survey Email

From: Heather Sarsons

To: [TEACHER'S EMAIL]

Subject: A short survey for a Yale and UChicago study



Yale University



THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO

Good evening,

We are a team of researchers at The University of Chicago and Yale University, and we are conducting a research study on public sector employees' perceptions about their jobs. As part of this study, we would like to ask you to fill in a **very short survey (length < 5 mins)**. This survey is confidential, completely anonymous, and has been approved by the Institution Review Boards at Yale and the University of Chicago. Your participation is invaluable for our research.

If you would like to take the survey, please click here:

Follow this link to the Survey:

[LINK]

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:

[URL]

We sincerely appreciate your time and participation, and please feel free to contact us with any questions. Thank you!

Best regards,

Barbara Biasi

(email: barbara.biasi@yale.edu, website: www.barbarabiasi.com)

Heather Sarsons

(email: heather.sarsons@chicagobooth.edu, website: sites.google.com/view/sarsons/)

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