Online Appendix for
How Does Wage Inequality Affect the Labor Movement?

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A Derivation of Model Extension to Three Productivity Types and the Organizers' Choice of Bargaining Unit Size

This appendix provides a self-contained derivation of the equilibrium in the three-type extension and proves the key results referenced in Section II.B.

A.1 Setup and Notation

Workers are indexed $j \in \{1,2,3\}$ with inside-firm productivities $\alpha_1 < \alpha_2 < \alpha_3$, workforce shares $\phi_1 > \phi_2 > \phi_3 > 0$, $\sum_j \phi_j = 1$, and $\phi_1 > \frac{1}{2}$. The outside option of type j is y_j^O, with $y_1^O = 0$ and $y_j^O = A_j \alpha_j - \bar{e}_j$ for $j \in \{2,3\}$, $A_j > 1$. The wage contract is $w(y^C) = \gamma + \beta y^C$, $\beta \geq 0$, $\gamma \geq 0$.

A.2 Baseline Union $\{1,2\}$

The union $\{1,2\}$ covers types 1 and 2. Expected output within this coalition is

$$Ey_{12}^C = \frac{\phi_1 \alpha_1 + \phi_2 \alpha_2}{\phi_1 + \phi_2}. \tag{1}$$

The firm's zero-profit condition binds, giving $\gamma = (1-\beta) Ey_{12}^C$. Since $Ey_{12}^C > \alpha_1$ (type 1 is below average), the median voter's payoff $Ey_{12}^C - \beta(Ey_{12}^C - \alpha_1)$ is decreasing in β; they minimize β subject to type 2's no-quitting condition. Substituting the binding zero-profit condition and solving:

$$\beta_{12}^* = \frac{A_2 \alpha_2 - \bar{e}_2 - Ey_{12}^C}{\alpha_2 - Ey_{12}^C} = 1 - \frac{\bar{e}_2 - (A_2 - 1)\alpha_2}{\frac{\phi_1}{\phi_1 + \phi_2}(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)}. \tag{2}$$

Feasibility requires $\beta_{12}^* \leq 1$, i.e. $(A_2 - 1)\alpha_2 \leq \bar{e}_2$, equivalently $\alpha_2 \leq \alpha_2^* \equiv \bar{e}_2/(A_2 - 1)$—the direct analogue of $\eta \leq \eta^*$ in the baseline. Type 1's equilibrium payoff is

$$W_1^{12} = Ey_{12}^C - \beta_{12}^*(Ey_{12}^C - \alpha_1). \tag{3}$$

A.3 Expanded Union $\{1,2,3\}$

With all three types in the union, expected output is

$$Ey^C_{123} = \phi_1\alpha_1 + \phi_2\alpha_2 + \phi_3\alpha_3 > Ey^C_{12}, \tag{4}$$

where the inequality holds because $\alpha_3 > Ey^C_{12}$ (type 3 is above the two-type average). The zero-profit condition gives $\gamma = (1-\beta)Ey^C_{123}$. Substituting, the no-quitting condition for type $j \in \{2,3\}$ becomes

$$Ey^C_{123} + \beta\left(\alpha_j - Ey^C_{123}\right) \geq A_j\alpha_j - \bar{e}_j. \tag{5}$$

Provided $\alpha_j > Ey^C_{123}$ (type j is above the union average, which holds for $j = 3$ by construction and generically for $j = 2$ when $\phi_1 > \frac{1}{2}$ and ϕ_3 is small), the minimum piece rate required to retain type j is[1]

$$\beta^*_j\big|_{123} = \frac{A_j\alpha_j - \bar{e}_j - Ey^C_{123}}{\alpha_j - Ey^C_{123}}. \tag{6}$$

The equilibrium piece rate is $\beta^*_{123} = \max\left(\beta^*_2|_{123}, \beta^*_3|_{123}\right)$, and the expanded union is feasible if and only if $\beta^*_{123} \leq 1$.

A.4 Type 2's Constraint Is Relaxed in the Expanded Union

Proposition 1. *If the* $\{1,2\}$ *union is feasible* ($\beta^*_{12} \leq 1$)*, then* $\beta^*_2\big|_{123} \leq \beta^*_{12}$.

Proof. Let $N_2 \equiv A_2\alpha_2 - \bar{e}_2$, $\bar{E}_{12} \equiv Ey^C_{12}$, and $\bar{E}_{123} \equiv Ey^C_{123}$. Form the difference:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta^*_2\big|_{123} - \beta^*_{12} &= \frac{N_2 - \bar{E}_{123}}{\alpha_2 - \bar{E}_{123}} - \frac{N_2 - \bar{E}_{12}}{\alpha_2 - \bar{E}_{12}} \\ &= \frac{(\bar{E}_{123} - \bar{E}_{12})\left[(A_2 - 1)\alpha_2 - \bar{e}_2\right]}{(\alpha_2 - \bar{E}_{123})(\alpha_2 - \bar{E}_{12})},\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where the second line follows by expanding and collecting terms (the $N_2\alpha_2$ and $\bar{E}_{12}\bar{E}_{123}$ terms cancel).

[1] If instead $\alpha_2 < Ey^C_{123}$—which can arise when type 3 is sufficiently productive to pull the union average above type 2's inside-firm productivity—the coefficient $(\alpha_2 - Ey^C_{123})$ in (5) is negative and the inequality reverses. Type 2's wage $(1-\beta)Ey^C_{123} + \beta\alpha_2$ is then *decreasing* in β: type 2 becomes a net beneficiary of compression, cross-subsidised by type 3 through the higher fixed component. Their no-quitting condition becomes the *upper* bound $\beta \leq [Ey^C_{123} - (A_2\alpha_2 - \bar{e}_2)]/(Ey^C_{123} - \alpha_2)$, which does not constrain the median voter (who minimises β regardless). Type 2's no-quitting condition therefore drops out of the problem entirely in this case.

The denominator is positive because $\alpha_2 > \bar{E}_{123} > \bar{E}_{12}$ under our maintained assumptions. The factor $(\bar{E}_{123} - \bar{E}_{12}) > 0$ because adding the productive type 3 raises average output. Feasibility of the {1,2} union requires $(A_2 - 1)\alpha_2 \leq \bar{e}_2$, so the remaining numerator factor is non-positive. Therefore $\beta_2^*|_{123} \leq \beta_{12}^*$. □

Intuition. Including type 3 raises Ey^C, which raises the fixed component $\gamma = (1-\beta)Ey^C$ at any given β. Type 2 benefits directly from this higher fixed payment, so a lower piece rate suffices to satisfy their outside-option condition.

When type 2's constraint binds: unconditional expansion. Although relaxed by Proposition 1, type 2's constraint may still be tighter than type 3's when A_2 is large relative to A_3, i.e. when condition (8) holds:

$$\frac{A_2\alpha_2 - \bar{e}_2 - Ey_{123}^C}{\alpha_2 - Ey_{123}^C} > \frac{A_3\alpha_3 - \bar{e}_3 - Ey_{123}^C}{\alpha_3 - Ey_{123}^C}. \tag{8}$$

In that case $\beta_{123}^* = \beta_2^*|_{123}$. Crucially, the organizer's decision is then trivial.

Proposition 2. *If $\beta_{123}^* = \beta_2^*|_{123}$ (type 2's no-quitting condition is binding in the expanded union), then $W_1^{123} > W_1^{12}$ unconditionally: the organizer always prefers to expand the bargaining unit.*

Proof. Write $\Delta E \equiv Ey_{123}^C - Ey_{12}^C > 0$ and $\Delta\beta \equiv \beta_2^*|_{123} - \beta_{12}^* < 0$ (strict inequality from Proposition 1 when $\beta_{12}^* < 1$). Then:

$$\begin{aligned} W_1^{123} - W_1^{12} &= \left[Ey_{123}^C - \beta_2^*|_{123}(Ey_{123}^C - \alpha_1)\right] - \left[Ey_{12}^C - \beta_{12}^*(Ey_{12}^C - \alpha_1)\right] \\ &= \Delta E(1-\beta_{12}^*) + |\Delta\beta|(Ey_{123}^C - \alpha_1). \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

Both terms are strictly positive: $\Delta E > 0$, $\beta_{12}^* < 1$ (feasibility), $|\Delta\beta| > 0$, and $Ey_{123}^C > \alpha_1$. Therefore $W_1^{123} > W_1^{12}$. □

Intuition. When the intermediate type faces the more competitive outside market (A_2 large relative to A_3), including the top type simultaneously *raises* average output and *relaxes* the binding constraint. Both effects unambiguously benefit the median voter, so no threshold balancing gains against costs is needed. This highlights a distinct channel through which top-end productivity can strengthen, rather than erode, the viability of a broader bargaining unit: the top type cross-subsidises the fixed component, automatically satisfying the intermediate type's outside-option condition without forcing the median voter to concede further wage dispersion.

A.5 The Organizer's Threshold

Type 1's payoff under the expanded union is

$$W_1^{123} = Ey_{123}^C - \beta_{123}^*(Ey_{123}^C - \alpha_1). \tag{10}$$

The organizer prefers the expanded union ($W_1^{123} \geq W_1^{12}$) if and only if condition (6) holds. Substituting β_{123}^* from (6) (taking $j=3$ as the binding constraint) and differentiating with respect to A_3:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_3^*|_{123}}{\partial A_3} = \frac{\alpha_3}{\alpha_3 - Ey_{123}^C} > 0. \tag{11}$$

The right-hand side of (6) is therefore strictly increasing in A_3, while the left-hand side is independent of A_3. This guarantees a unique threshold $\bar{A}_3$ at which the organizer is indifferent. For $A_3 \leq \bar{A}_3$, expansion is preferred; for $A_3 > \bar{A}_3$, the organizer retains the $\{1,2\}$ union.

Comparative statics on $\bar{A}_3$.

- *Share ϕ_3:* A larger share of type-3 workers raises Ey_{123}^C and thus the left-hand side of (6). At the same time it raises Ey_{123}^C in the denominator of β_3^*, reducing the required piece rate. Both effects favour expansion, so $\bar{A}_3$ is increasing in ϕ_3 (with off-setting reductions in ϕ_2): more numerous top workers make inclusion more attractive to the median voter.

- *Productivity α_3:* Higher α_3 raises the left-hand side of (6) (higher average output) but also raises $A_3\alpha_3$ (harder to retain type 3), affecting both sides. The net effect on $\bar{A}_3$ is ambiguous without further parametric restrictions.

- *Switching cost $\bar{e}_3$:* A higher switching cost for type 3 reduces the piece rate required to retain them (lower β_3^*), lowering the cost of expansion. Therefore $\bar{A}_3$ is increasing in $\bar{e}_3$: more expensive mobility for type 3 makes them easier to include.

B Pay Misperceptions, Transparency and Organizer Choices

B.1 Mechanism 1: Anchoring on own wage for own outside option

In the organizer section, we introduce the idea that, when there are information frictions, organizers can act as *information intermediaries*, and whether or not to reveal information about pay becomes an organizing strategy. When inequality is greater than workers believe it to be, misperceptions can sustain support for a compressed contract. In particular, if high-productivity workers anchor perceptions of their outside options on their current pay (underestimating their outside options in our setting), the union would be able to maintain greater pooled resources for the median voter by reducing high types' perceived bargaining position. In this case, the organizer would have an incentive to withhold pay information rather than reveal it. This tension is especially sharp in high-inequality environments, where large outside-option differences make union failure more likely under full information. Our organizer survey evidence is consistent with this mechanism: when inequality is greater, organizers are less likely to disclose prevailing wages.

B.2 Mechanism 2: Anchoring on own wage and productivity for others

In the case of Hollywood, workers may anchor beliefs about others on themselves within the unionized sector. For example, high-type workers may infer that low-type productivity, α, is closer to high-type productivity, η, than it actually is, overestimating average productivity.

Let w_L and w_H denote the wages implied by the initial union contract given misperceptions. High types' misperception leads them to underestimate the size of the transfer implied by the median-voter demand. Define the per-high-type transfer $\tau(w_L;\alpha)$ as the reduction in each high type's wage below her inside productivity η that is required, under zero profits, to finance the gap between the low-type wage w_L and low-type productivity α. The zero-profit condition implies

$$\phi w_H + (1-\phi) w_L = \phi\eta + (1-\phi)\alpha, \tag{12}$$

and therefore

$$\tau(w_L;\alpha) \equiv \eta - w_H = \frac{1-\phi}{\phi}(w_L - \alpha). \tag{13}$$

High types' misperception leads them to underestimate the size of the transfer implied by the

median-voter demand. Instead, they compute this transfer using $\tilde{\alpha}$, the perceived low-type productivity, and so infer a *smaller* transfer:

$$\tau(w_L;\tilde{\alpha})-\tau(w_L;\alpha)=-\frac{1-\phi}{\phi}(\tilde{\alpha}-\alpha)<0. \tag{14}$$

The actual per-high-type transfer exceeds what they anticipated by $(1-\phi)(\tilde{\alpha}-\alpha)/\phi$. When high types learn the true α, they revise the implied transfer upward. If the corrected high-type wage lies below their outside option $A\eta-e$, they exit. An organizer may therefore choose not to correct misperceptions.

C Earnings Inequality Within Occupations

C.1 Decomposing Earnings Inequality Over Time: Roles of Industries and Occupations

In this paper, we study how inequality among workers in similar industries, occupations, or firms can affect unionization outcomes. In this section, we situate this inquiry within the broader context of rising U.S. income inequality over recent decades by tracing inequality evolution along both industry and occupation layers using publicly available survey data. For firm-level inequality Song et al. (2019) and Haltiwanger et al. (2024) provide decompositions running between the late 1970s through the 2010s.

We explore this through a within- vs. between-group decomposition of earnings (annual labor income) inequality, using microdata from the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). To minimize confounding by compositional changes, we follow conventions in the inequality literature and focus on a group of full-year non-self-employed civilian male workers with age between 20–65 and earnings over half the full-time, full-year minimum wage.[2] Due to changes in how ASEC handles top earnings over time, we further winsorize earnings above the 99th percentile as in Hoffmann et al. (2020). In Figure A.1, we decompose the variance of log earnings (Y) within vs. between categories using the following identity, first along industries (Panel A), then along occupations (Panel B), and finally along interacted industry-occupation cells (Panel C).[3]

$$\mathbf{Var}\left[Y \mid \text{Year}=t\right] = \underbrace{\mathbf{E}\left[\mathbf{Var}\left[Y \mid \text{Group}, \text{Year}=t\right]\right]}_{\text{within-group variance}} + \underbrace{\mathbf{Var}\left[\mathbf{E}\left[Y \mid \text{Group}, \text{Year}=t\right]\right]}_{\text{between-group variance}} \tag{15}$$

[2] This minimum wage-based earnings threshold is used instead of a full-time filter due to inconsistencies in the reporting of hours over time.

[3] Panel A uses 3-digit 1990 Census Industry Codes with 236 distinct industries; Panel B uses 4-digit 2010 Census Occupational Classification definitions with 453 distinct occupations; Finally, Panel C uses cells formed by corresponding 2-digit industry and occupation codes, with around 2,000 cells per year (the precise number fluctuates slightly over year as cells with fewer than 2 workers are dropped from analysis.)

Figure A.1
Earnings Inequality Decomposition within and between Industries and Occupations



Notes. This figure presents the decomposition of the variance of log annual earnings into within and between components along occupation and industry boundaries. The source is authors' calculations based on microdata from the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The sample includes full-year non-self-employed civilian male workers with age between 20 and 65 and earnings over half the full-time, full-year minimum wage. Panel A shows the decomposition using 236 industries from the 1990 Census Industry Codes. Panel B shows the decomposition using 453 occupations from the 2010 Census Occupational Codes. Panel C shows the decomposition using around 2000 cells formed by industry and occupation codes at coarser, 2-digit levels (the precise number of cells fluctuate slightly over year as cells with fewer than 2 workers are dropped from analysis).

D Additional Details on Study I: Organizer Survey

D.1 Unrestricted Sample of Respondents

Our main sample of organizers includes only responses where the organizer left a valid email address at the end of the survey (N=182, Section III.A). This restriction aims to ensure responses are from real organizers and are from our intended respondents. We investigate the consequences of this restriction and replicate our key results using the unrestricted sample of respondents (N=221). We find a similar gap in the median predicted vote share (8pp, p<0.001). The effects of the unequal environment on worker wage demands and exit are virtually identical in both samples (Appendix Figure D.1). Additionally, the effects of the unequal environment on organizing strategies are generally consistent with baseline results for decisions around pay transparency, campaign priorities, and bargaining unit size, although exact magnitudes vary (Appendix Figure D.2). In the unrestricted sample, 69% of respondents prefer to allocate resources to the equal environment, compared to 67% in the restricted sample.

D.2 Robustness to Vignette Order

We present organizers with questions about the equal and unequal environments in a random order. Here, we report results from the main sample separately for those who saw the equal environment first versus those who saw the unequal environment first to confirm that the order in which organizers see vignettes does not drive our results. We find that the median predicted vote share is significantly lower in the unequal environment regardless of order. Those who saw the equal environment first predict 5 pp lower support (p = 0.036) in the unequal environment, while those who saw the unequal environment first predict a 9 pp decline (p=0.001). Results about worker demands, worker exit, and organizing strategies are directionally similar to the main results (Figures D.3 and D.4). The coefficients in the sample of respondents who saw the equal environment first are never statistically different from those in the sample of respondents who saw the unequal environment first, with the exception of the effect of the unequal environment on publishing pay information after the campaign (difference p = 0.061). However, we find similar negative effects of the unequal environment on organizers' decision to publish pay information during the campaign: the p-value of the difference in the combined coefficient on publishing pay information *either* after the campaign or never, as opposed to during the campaign, is 0.186. Additionally, the magnitude

of the shift in campaign priorities away from raising pay is larger among those who saw the unequal environment first (-14.6pp) than those who saw the equal environment first (-6.5pp), but not statistically different between the two groups (difference $p = 0.302$). Finally, shares choosing to allocate resources to the equal environment are 67% regardless of which vignette was seen first.

D.3 Recruitment Materials

We sent the following message for survey recruitment starting on July 2, 2024:

Dear [first name],

We are surveying labor organizers. As a token of appreciation, we offer $30 to survey takers in the form of a gift card. The goal of the survey is to better understand the barriers unions face when organizing a workplace (link below). We would be super appreciative if you could take 10 minutes to complete this - we don't want to lose your voice!

Here is the link to the survey: [personalized link]

We will share with respondents our aggregate insights. Participation in the survey will be anonymous and answers will be aggregated.

Important note on the project: We do not ask any questions on your strategies related to specific campaigns and we never ask organizers which campaigns they worked on. We take very seriously how important it is to keep organizing tactics at a given workplace private. The research is also not funded by any external grant agency: we are using our personal research fund to compensate organizers for their time.

Table D.1
Organizer Summary Statistics

	(1)
National Unions (%)	
AFL-CIO	24.2
	(3.2)
IATSE	9.3
	(2.2)
SEIU	9.9
	(2.2)
Industry (2-digit NAICS) (%)	
Educational Services	14.8
	(2.6)
Health Care and Social Assistance	14.3
	(2.6)
Transportation and Warehousing	12.1
	(2.4)
State (%)	
CA	11.5
	(2.4)
MA	7.7
	(2.0)
NY	8.2
	(2.0)
Individual Characteristics	
Lead Organizer (%)	66.5
	(3.5)
Average Years Experience	6.66
	(0.26)
Most Recent Organizing Experience	
New Union (vs. Existing) (%)	58.2
	(3.7)
Average Year	2022
	(0.34)
N Organizers	182

Notes. This table provides summary statistics about our sample of organizers, from the organizer survey described in Section III. For three categories (union, industry, state), we report the share of organizers in each of the top 3 most common groups. We also report two individual characteristics of organizers: whether they have lead organizing experience and their average years of experience (responses are topcoded at 10 years). Finally, we report two characteristics regarding each organizers' most recent organizing experience: whether they were organizing a new union or an existing one, and the average year of the

most recent organizing experience.

Table D.2
Organizer Respondent Composition by National Union

National Union	(1) Respondent %	(2) Contact %	(3) National %
SEIU	11.3	5.4	13.6
IATSE	10.7	16.6	1.2
Unite Here	8.2	6.5	2.1
CWA	5.7	1.7	4.6
TWU	5.0	7.5	1.1
UFCW	4.4	1.5	8.4
AFT	3.1	1.5	12.6
OPEIU	3.1	1.2	0.7
AFSCME	3.1	1.5	9.0
IAM	2.5	1.1	3.8
ATU	2.5	6.7	1.4
IBT	1.9	2.0	8.7
SMART	1.3	0.5	1.4
IBEW	1.3	1.6	5.0
NEA	1.3	0.6	19.9
LIUNA	0.6	0.5	4.1
UAW	0.6	1.6	2.6
IUOE	0.6	0.5	2.9

Notes. This table provides summary statistics of the national union organizations from which we had at least 10 contacts for the organizer survey in Section III. Columns (1)-(2) show the share of respondents and contacts from each organization, respectively. Column (3) reports membership from each organization's 2024 Office of Labor-Management Standards LM-2 filing, scaled by the BLS estimate that 14.3 million U.S. wage and salary workers were union members in 2024 (BLS, 2025). This statistic should be interpreted as an approximate size benchmark rather than a population share: LM-2 membership is reported using membership categories tracked by each labor organization, while the BLS denominator is restricted to employed U.S. wage and salary workers. As a result, the percentages in Column (3) need not sum to 100. AFL-CIO is excluded from the table, given many other national unions are AFL-CIO affiliated and we cannot distinguish between primary and secondary affiliations in the OLMS data. We identified 27.7% of our respondents and 34.2% of our contacts as having primary affiliation with the AFL-CIO.

Figure D.1
Unrestricted Sample of Organizers: Worker Actions by Outside Option



Notes. This figure replicates Figure II using the unrestricted sample of 221 organizers. It shows how predicted worker actions vary across workers with different outside options when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section III. In Panel A, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average predicted wage demands by group in the equal environment. In Panel B, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average share of workers, by group, that organizers expect to apply for jobs elsewhere during the union campaign in the equal environment. Estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment on each outcome by group. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that each coefficient equals zero and report p-values to the right of the plots.

Figure D.2
Unrestricted Sample of Organizers: Organizing Strategies



Notes. This figure replicates Figure III using the unrestricted sample of 221 organizers. It shows how organizers adapt their campaign strategies when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section III. Under each outcome specified on the y-axis, *Equal Env. Mean* reports the average outcome in the equal environment, while plotted estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment. Specifically, coefficients under header *Pay Transparency* report whether organizers would publish market wage information from Figure I; coefficients under header *Campaign Priority* report which of the three issues organizers would prioritize during the campaign; the coefficient under header *Bargaining Units* reports whether organizers would pursue separate, smaller bargaining units for different worker types. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that each coefficient equals zero and report p-values to the right of the plot.

Figure D.3
Results by Vignette Order: Worker Actions by Outside Option



Notes. This figure replicates Figure II, split by which vignette organizers see first. It shows how predicted worker actions vary across workers with different outside options when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section III. In Panel A, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average predicted wage demands by group in the equal environment. In Panel B, *Equal Env. Mean* report the average share of workers, by group, that organizers expect to apply for jobs elsewhere during the union campaign in the equal environment. Estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment on each outcome by group, split by vignette order. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal between the two samples and report p-values to the right of the plots. Sample size is 182 organizers.

Figure D.4
Results by Vignette Order: Organizing Strategies



Notes. This figure replicates Figure III, split by which vignette organizers see first. It shows how organizers adapt their campaign strategies when market wage inequality increases, from the organizer survey described in Section III. Under each outcome specified on the y-axis, *Equal Env. Mean* reports the average outcome in the equal environment, while plotted estimates show the effect of moving from the equal environment to the unequal environment, split by vignette order. Specifically, coefficients under header *Pay Transparency* report whether organizers would publish market wage information from Figure I; coefficients under header *Campaign Priority* report which of the three issues organizers would prioritize during the campaign; the coefficient under header *Bargaining Units* reports whether organizers would pursue separate, smaller bargaining units for different worker types. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the organizer level. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal between the two samples and report p-values to the right of the plots. Sample size is 182 organizers.

E Evidence on the Labor Movement from National Administrative Datasets

E.1 Data Details for Cross-Sectional Analysis

We present findings on the cross-sectional relationship between within-industry wage inequality and unionization outcomes at the economy-wide level. Section III.F discusses some of the key variables involved as well as qualitative interpretations of results; here we discuss in greater detail the data sources and steps involved in the cross-sectional analysis. While ideally inequality would be measured at the occupation level to align with our main analyses, our datasets on unionization lack occupational identifiers but include information on the employer's industry. Therefore, we map each union contract or unionized establishment to its corresponding industry cell and study the relationship between unionization outcomes and wage inequality within that cell.

The construction of outcome variables in Figures IV, E.1, and E.2 have been discussed in Section III.F. In short, Panel A and B of these figures analyze union contracts (formally "collective bargaining agreements") from the Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) Online Disclosure Room database. The database contains 3,007 private-sector contracts. To match the availability of ACS data used to estimate wage ratios, we focus on 602 contracts with a start year between 2002-2022, of which 451 contain valid industry and state information. In Panel A, we define a fixed pay scale as one that explicitly sets pay levels for each position and level of experience. Using this definition, we classify each contract based on whether it includes such a scale. In Panel B, we break contracts into 100-word segments and assign textual topics for each segment using the Anchored Correlation Explanation (CorEx) model. CorEx is a semi-supervised topic model that allows the researcher to input topic-specific "anchor words" guiding the model to identify coherent topics of interest. We find the numbers of contract segments that discuss "pay-related", "benefits-related", and "(working) conditions-related" topics and calculate the relative shares of each topic. We implement the model with 10 topics (3 main and 7 residuals) and anchor strength 5. The anchor words are "pay, salary, wage, pay raise, wage increase" for pay, "benefits, insurance, pension, retirement, vacation" for benefits, and "hours, safety, workplace, injury, hazards" for conditions. The anchor words are initialization inputs to the model and are not meant to be exhaustive for each topic. In Panel C, we track sizes of bargaining units using Collective Bargaining Notice (F-7) data from the Federal Mediation

and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The dataset covers 79,822 establishment-level bargaining units between 2015-2021 and contains information on both the size of the bargaining unit and the size of the establishment. For each unit, we calculate a "coverage rate" equal to the unit size divided by the establishment size.

The OLMS contract data, the FMCS F-7 bargaining data, and the NLRB election data all contain industry identifiers of the employer or establishment, allowing us to map each contract or establishment to wage inequality in a particular industry cell. We define industry at the 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level. Our overarching goal is to estimate wage inequality (in the form of log p90-p50 ratio) at the industry × state × year level using the most reliable, available survey data for the time period in question, while striking a balance between precision and noise when deciding the level of aggregation. As a result, individual panels of Figures IV and E.1 use somewhat different data sources and cell definitions, the rationales for which are discussed below.

Panel A and B of Figure IV estimate wage ratios using microdata from the American Community Survey (ACS) between 2002 and 2022. Individuals report annual labor earnings, weeks worked, and usual weekly hours in the ACS; however, weeks worked are reported in bins in some years, precluding a reliable calculation of hourly wage. Instead, we use the annual labor earnings among non-self-employed workers with at least 48 weeks worked and at least 30 hours per week (roughly "full-time, full-year workers") as a proxy. To reduce noise from limited sample size, we estimate the log p90-p50 ratio at the 2-digit NAICS × 3-year × Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region level.

Panel C of Figure IV makes use of industry × state × year-level wage estimates from the Occupation Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) data, which is based on surveys of roughly half of all establishments in the U.S. The OEWS is far more precise than the ACS, but state-industry estimates are only available after 2012 (so it is not used in Panel A and B). OEWS estimates include both the 90th and the 50th percentile of hourly wages, allowing for a direct calculation of the log p90-p50 ratio.

To address the concern that the wage ratios used in Figure IV may be affected by the presence of unionized workers, Figure E.1 uses CPS microdata, which contains information on union membership, to estimate wage ratios after subtracting industry-specific union premia. The union premium is estimated by regressing, for each 3-year period, log wages on age, age squared, and state, sex, education, industry, and occupation fixed effects, plus industry-specific union membership dummies. The rest of the CPS data construction follows the discussion for Figure E.4 below.

Finally, to address the concerns that our results depend on the bidirectional causal relationship between

unionization and inequality, we replicate the figure using pre-period rather than contemporaneous wage ratios in Figure E.2. In each panel, we measure the log p90/p50 using the first available years of data for each sample (2002-2004 for ACS, 2015 for OEWS).

E.2 Data Details for Longitudinal Analysis

We present findings on the relationship between economy-wide inequality and the focus of union campaigns over time. Section III.F describes the analysis in general and provides a qualitative interpretation of results; here we discuss in greater detail the steps involved.

To obtain the topic shares used in Figure E.3, we collect and analyze text from the AFL-CIO News, the official newspaper of the national AFL-CIO union federation between 1955 and 1996. AFL-CIO News has been widely used by labor historians in archival research (Holloway, 1979; Minchin, 2017; Sheehan, 2024). To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze its text quantitatively. We break news articles into 200-word segments and assign textual topics for each segment using the CorEx model with the same anchor words and anchor strength as in our contract analysis. In other words, we run the model with 10 topics (3 main and 7 residuals) and anchor strength 5. The anchor words for the 3 main topics are "pay, salary, wage, pay raise, wage increase" for pay, "benefits, insurance, pension, retirement, vacation" for benefits, and "hours, safety, workplace, injury, hazards" for (working) conditions. (Note the anchor words are initialization inputs to the model and are not meant to be exhaustive for each topic.) Using the model output, we find the number of news segments each year that discuss "pay-related", "benefits-related", and "conditions-related" topics and calculate the relative shares of each topic out of the sum of the three. Finally, Panel A of Figure E.3 plots the pay-related topic share against two aggregate inequality measures: the top 10% income share and the Gini coefficient. We use these measures of inequality to mirror those in Farber et al. (2021). The numbers themselves are taken from the replication package that paper.

E.3 Additional Results on Cross-sectional Inequality and Union Density

Here we present patterns in the relationship between inequality and union density cross-sectionally that shed light on causal channels at play. Our theoretical framework predicts that settings with higher wage inequality should exhibit lower union support, particularly among high-wage workers. The selection out of unionization by high-wage earners is one marker of a causal relationship between high individual

bargaining power and lower participation in unions.

Figure E.4 begins by examining aggregate union membership patterns (not split by wage). Panel A plots the standard "stock measure": overall union membership rate against p90–p50 wage ratios, for each industry × region × 3-year cell in the Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1984 and 2019.[4] Panel B plots the same relationship using long differences between the earliest and latest 3-year cells on both axes. The relationship is highly negative, suggesting that overall union membership rates are lower in more unequal environments. In panel C, we construct a "flow" variable that better captures union formation dynamics, using NLRB election data compiled by Sojourner and Yang (2022) (1977–1999) and Ferguson (2018) (1999–2009). For each cell of industry × region over a three-year period, we calculate *the share of workers who are covered by union victories, out of the overall employment in that cell*.[5] This allows us to measure the "instantaneous thrust" of union activities and, unlike win rates among called elections, accounts for the endogeneity of election calls. Panel C shows that victorious union elections, over each 3-year period, also cover a smaller share of the industry-wide workforce in more unequal environments.

Figures E.5 and E.6 then explore the potentially heterogeneous impact of wage inequality on union membership between high- and low-wage workers. Figure E.5 divides workers in the CPS into 20 yearly wage ventiles (5-percent bins) and estimates union membership rates within each ventile, for five 7-year periods between 1984 and 2019.[6] In each period, union membership rates increase with wage and peak between the 70th–90th percentiles, before dropping steeply among workers in the top ten percent. Notably, this *membership-wage gradient* flattens substantially between 1984–2019, suggesting union membership decline is driven disproportionately by middle-to-higher-wage exit. Panel B divides workers by residual wages, after controlling for detailed worker-level observables. Panels C and D repeat the analysis among private-sector and public-sector workers, respectively. Across four panels, we find consistent descriptive

[4] In the CPS, we use either directly reported wages for hourly workers or salaries divided by hours worked for salaried workers. Like ACS wage ratios in Figure IV, we estimate the log p90-p50 ratio at the 2-digit NAICS × 3-year × Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region level to reduce noise. Since the CPS has even smaller sample sizes than the ACS, we also merge several tiny industry cells (NAICS 21 and 22 into 11, 53 into 52, and 72 into 71). Wage ratios are calculated after subtracting cell-level union premium estimates to address potential effect of unionization on wage ratios. Finally, the proportion of topcoded wages is much higher in the CPS and often exceeds 10% in some industry cells. To address this issue, we impute log p90-p50 ratios for these cells (with topcoding rates over 10%) by calculating their log p80-p50 ratios and then adding the average difference between log p90-p50 and log p80-p50 ratios among all remaining cells.

[5] To calculate the number of workers covered by union victories, we sum the number of workers who are "eligible voters" associated with victorious election events, across all establishments in each industry × region × 3-year cell. To measure overall employment, we use our CPS sample (non-self-employed civilian workers aged 20–65 who work at least 20 hours per week with an hourly wage equivalent above one-half of the federal minimum wage), averaging over a three-year period and applying survey weights to scale the Current Population Survey (CPS) sample to the full economy.

[6] 1984 is the first year CPS consistently asked all respondents about union membership.

evidence that union membership decline is greater among middle-to-higher-wage workers, consistent with our predictions and also our empirical findings in the Wisconsin and Hollywood setting.[7]

Finally, Figure E.6 provides industry-level evidence. Panel A plots union membership gap between high- and low-wage workers (defined using the median wage in each cell) against p90–p50 wage ratios, for each industry × region × 3-year cell in the CPS between 1984 and 2019.[8] The relationship is strongly negative. Panels B further examines correlated movements by long differencing x-axis and y-axis measures between 1984–2019 for each industry cell. The negative relationship suggests that industries experiencing greater inequality growth in this period also saw more high-wage union membership erosion, as our model and findings predict.

Figure E.5 and Figure E.6 are complementary evidence with slightly different assumptions. Figure E.5, Panel A assumes that historical forces of union decline (other than rising inequality) should have impacted low- and high-wage workers similarly, and Panel B relaxes this condition to hold after conditioning on worker-level observables. Figure E.6, Panel B assumes that industries with more vs. less historical inequality growth are similar in terms of historical forces of union decline (other than rising inequality) that could have led to extra high-wage union decline.

E.4 Data Details for Cross-Country Analysis

We present analysis on the cross-country relationship between union membership and within-occupation inequality in Figure E.7. Here we present additional details on the construction of this figure. We use data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Work Orientations Survey. We include survey waves II-IV (1997, 2005, and 2015) but exclude Wave I as it measures income differently and includes few countries. We use the crosswalk from Humlum (2021) to crosswalk the ISCO88 codes used in waves II and III to the ISCO08 codes used in wave IV. The ISSP provides an opportunity to look at measures of union membership, occupation, and income within the same survey.

The figure includes the 20 OECD countries that appear in at least two of the three survey waves. Individuals in the survey report their union membership, income, and current occupation. We restrict the sample to individuals currently working for pay, who are not self employed, who report an occupation, income and membership status, and who are aged 20–65. We use the ISSP respondent weights when

[7] Notably, among workers above the 50th percentile, union membership decline slows after 2000 as "within" inequality measures stabilize, but this deceleration is not seen among workers below the 50th percentile.

[8] Wage ratio construction follows the same procedure as in Figure E.4.

computing occupation-country-wave union membership rates and income percentiles.[9] We additionally restrict to wave-occupation-country cells that, after sample restrictions, include more than 10 unweighted respondents. In the survey, union membership is measured with the question: "Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation? If yes: is that currently or only previously?" This allows us to distinguish membership from individuals covered by union contracts, which is particularly important in settings with sectoral bargaining.

[9]For Germany in 1997, we combine the East and West German samples using the GESIS weights for an all-Germany representative sample (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 1997).

Figure E.1
Cross-sectional Relationships between Inequality and Union Organizing Strategies: Adjusting for Union Wage Effect

PANEL A: Share of Contracts with Pay Scales



PANEL B: Pay-related Topic Share in Contracts



PANEL C: Estab-level Bargaining Unit Coverage Rate



Notes. Each panel plots a binscatter of a union outcome against industry-region-3 year wage ratios, similar to Figure IV but using CPS wages after subtracting off industry × year-specific union premium estimates. For a handful of cells with topcoding rates of over 10%, we impute log p90-p50 ratios by calculating their log p80-p50 ratios and then adding the average difference between log p90-p50 and log p80-p50 ratios among all remaining cells. Panel A shows the pay scale status of 451 contracts between 2002-2022. Panel B shows the "pay-related" topic share in the same 451 contracts. Panel C shows the size of 79822 bargaining units as a share of establishment-level employment. The relationships are overall steeper. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the union and employer levels.

Figure E.2
Pre-Period Industry-Region Inequality and Union Organizing Strategies

Panel A: Share of Contracts with Pay Scales



Panel B: Pay-related Topic Share in Contracts



Panel C: Estab-level Bargaining Unit Coverage Rate



Notes. Each panel plots a binscatter of a union outcome against industry-region wage ratios, similar to Figure IV, but instead using inequality measured in the earliest cell year of each analysis. Panel A shows the pay scale status of 451 contracts between 2002–2022 while Panel B shows the "pay-related" topic share (out of pay, benefits, and conditions) computed using the CorEx model in the same 451 contracts. Panel C shows the size of 79,820 bargaining units as a share of establishment-level employment, using Collective Bargaining Notice (F-7) data from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) between 2015–2021. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the union and employer levels.

Figure E.3
Time-series Relationships between Coverage Focus of AFL-CIO News and Aggregate Inequality

PANEL A: Pay-related Topic Share vs. Aggregate Inequality



PANEL B: Topic Shares in AFL-CIO News Segments by Year



Notes. This figure explores how the focus of AFL-CIO news coverage evolved in relation to rising income inequality over the second half of the 20th century. Mirroring Figure 1 of Farber et al. (2021), Panel A plots the "pay-related" topic share in AFL-CIO News segments on union activities over time, juxtaposed against the top 10% income share (from Piketty et al. (2018)) and the Gini coefficient (using Social Security earnings from Kopczuk et al. (2010)). Panel B plots the evolution of topic shares for all three main topics over time. The topic shares are obtained by running the CorEx model, discussed in detail in Section III.F.

Figure E.4
Union Membership and Industry Wage Inequality I: Stock vs. Flow

PANEL A: "Stock": Overall Membership Rate vs. Wage Inequality



PANEL B: Long Differences in "Stock"



PANEL C: "Flow": % of Workers Covered by Union Election Victories vs. Wage Inequality



Notes. This figure explores how industry wage inequality is correlated with union membership, using both a "stock" measure of overall membership and a novel "flow" measure of union victory coverage rate. Panel A plots a binscatter of the overall union membership rate against industry-region-3-year log p90-p50 wage ratios (1984–2019). Panel B plots the same relationship using long differences between the earliest and latest 3-year cells. In Panel C, the y-axis is the percentage of workers covered by union victories as a share of overall industry employment; NLRB election data (1982–2008) is used to estimate number of workers covered, and CPS data over the same period is used to estimate overall employment. The CPS sample includes non-self-employed civilian workers aged 20–65 who work at least 20 hours per week with an hourly wage equivalent above one-half of the federal minimum wage. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the industry and region levels.

Figure E.5
Union Membership Across the Wage Distribution Over Time



Notes. This figure examines how union membership rates vary across the wage distribution, and how this "union-wage gradient" changes over time. Each panel divides workers into 20 within-year wage ventiles (5-percent bins) and estimates the union membership rate within each cell for 5 time periods (1984–1990, 1991–1997, 1998–2004, 2005–2011, and 2012–2019). The source is authors' calculations based on microdata from Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS sample includes non-self-employed civilian workers aged 20–65 who work at least 20 hours per week with an hourly wage equivalent above one-half of the federal minimum wage. Panel A uses raw wages of all eligible workers. Panel B uses residualized wages after controlling for year-specific age trends and sex, education, state, industry, occupation, and union fixed effects. Panels C and D restrict to private-sector and public sector workers, respectively.

Figure E.6
Union Membership and Industry Wage Inequality II: Heterogeneity by Wage

Panel A: High-Minus-Low-Wage Membership Gap vs. Wage Inequality



Panel B: High-Minus-Low-Wage Membership Gap vs. Wage Inequality
(Long Differences, 1984–2019)



Notes. This figure explores how industry wage inequality is correlated with union membership advantage among high-wage workers, and how they co-move over time. Panel A plots a binscatter of the membership gap between high- and low-wage workers (defined using the median wage within each industry-region-3-year cell) against industry-region-3-year log p90-p50 wage ratios between 1984–2019. Panels B follows the same setup, but both y- and x-axes become long-differenced changes between 1984–2019 to study correlated movements. The CPS sample includes non-self-employed civilian workers aged 20–65 who work at least 20 hours per week with an hourly wage equivalent above one-half of the federal minimum wage. Wage ratios are calculated after subtracting estimated cell-level union premium for union workers, and p80-p50 ratios are used to impute p90-p50 ratios for cells with topcoding rates over 10%. Standard errors are twoway clustered at the industry and region levels.

Figure E.7
Membership vs. Wage Inequality Across OECD Countries



Notes. This figure documents the relationship between union membership and occupational wage inequality across several OECD countries. The sample includes surveyed individuals in the ISSP Work Orientations survey waves II-IV (1997, 2005, and 2015) currently working for pay, who are not self employed, who report an occupation, income and membership status, and who are aged 20–65. We include cells with more than 10 respondents and cell-level union membership shares and income percentiles are calculated using ISSP respondent weights. We compute the share of union members and the 50th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution at the 2-digit ISCO code level, within country. The figure reports the coefficients from regressing the share of union members within an occupation on the log(p90/p50) wage ratio, for each country. See Section E.4 for additional details on construction. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level.

F Additional Details on Study II: Wisconsin's Act 10

F.1 Union Membership Data

To obtain information on individual-level union membership, we follow the method used by Foy (2024). This method involves the following steps.

1. **Clean the campaign contribution data**: We downloaded data on political contributions from the Wisconsin Campaign Finance Information System (WCFIS) website. We scraped all contributions records for all filing periods from 2016 to 2024 in which the Receiving Registrant is the Political Action Committee of the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) (the state chapter of the National Education Association, one of the two main teacher unions) or of one of the 13 regional branches. These data do not have an individual donor identifier, so we use names to identify each donor (we clean the names to account for inconsistencies, such as variations in middle name initials across time). Because donors may make more than one contribution during each time period, we sum all the contributions an individual makes in a given year to construct a dataset that is unique at the year and individual level.

2. **Clean the teacher records**: As in the rest of the paper, we use the All-Staff Files from the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) for 2007-2017. In keeping with Foy (2024), we restrict the sample to observations in which the salary is not equal to $0 and the FTE variable is not missing. Since individuals can appear more than once per year if they have multiple work assignments, we keep only the assignment with the highest FTE value so that the final dataset is unique at the individual-year level.

3. **Link the campaign contribution data to the teacher records**: The variables we want to use to link the two files above are name, year, and WEAC region. In the WCFIS contributions data, we observe all three of these variables. However, in the All-Staff records, we can see the district in which an individual works, but not the WEAC region that corresponds to that school district. Therefore, we scraped the WEAC region offices website to create a crosswalk between school districts and WEAC regional offices, which we merged by school district onto the All-Staff data. We then performed the merge in three steps:

(a) **Strict Merge:** We first merge the datasets on name, year, and WEAC region.

(b) **Fuzzy Merge by Year and Region:** For unmatched records, We perform a fuzzy merge on name within the same year and WEAC region.

(c) **Fuzzy Merge by Year Only:** Finally, We conduct another fuzzy merge on name by year, without requiring a WEAC region match. This step accounts for cases where individuals are linked to multiple districts and may be incorrectly assigned to a region in the all-staff data.

(d) **Constructing the union membership variable** Following Foy (2024), we assume that if a teacher appears in the contributions data, they are a union member for two reasons: (a) The majority of contributions in the WCFIS data are bunched at the $19.99 and $5.00 marks, which are the values that unions automatically redirect from member dues to their PACs. This is displayed in Figure F.1, where the top panel plots the distribution of political donations by teachers to the WEAC PAC and the bottom panel shows the distribution of donations to the regional chapters; (ii) it is uncommon for non-union members to donate to union-affiliated PACs.

F.2 CBA Expiration Dates

We collected information on each district's expiration date of the CBA in place when the reform passed. We use the dataset first compiled by Biasi (2021), constructed combining information from multiple sources, including union contracts, districts' employee handbooks, school board meeting minutes, and local news sources. Union contracts generally report the date of the expiration of the agreement. Post-Act 10 school board minutes typically mention whether a contract was set to expire in 2011. The presence of an early version of district employee handbooks is also useful to establish when the post-CBA pay regime was introduced (which typically coincides with the date of the earliest handbook at the latest). When available, the dataset prioritizes information from union contracts, school board minutes, and handbooks. In cases where these documents are unavailable, the records are complemented with information from online local news sources. The dataset contains information on 247 of the state's 428 districts, covering approximately 70% of all teachers. These data are described in Figure F.2.

F.3 Wisconsin School Districts, Commuting Zones, and Inequality Shocks

Our measure of inequality shock uses the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index of the local public teacher labor market to which each school district belongs to. We use commuting zones (CZs) as the relevant geographic labor market. Wisconsin had 421 school districts in 421, located in 19 commuting zones. Figure F.3 shows the location of CZs (marked by red lines) and school districts (marked by black lines) within the state. Darker colors denote a higher HHI, higher local labor market concentration, and a smaller inequality shock.

One key identifying assumption in our research design is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires no spillover or interference between treated and control units. In our design, SUTVA would be violated if teachers systematically moved between districts with and without a rise in inequality in response to the policy. To test the plausibility of this assumption, in Figure F.4 we perform an event study of each teacher's probability of moving out of the public sector, across districts, and across CZs, separately for districts with and without an inequality shock in a time window around the expiration of the CBA in each teacher's home district. We do so by re-estimating equation (7) of the paper on individual-level teacher data, using an indicator for teachers moving across districts as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, we find that in any given year, fewer than 1% of teachers move out of their commuting zone, and this mobility is similar across high- and low-HHI districts at all times, including after the reform.

F.4 Union Revenues Data

To compile a panel of union finance data, we use information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990 (the "Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax"), which most tax-exempt organizations, including labor unions, must file every year. We accessed a database of digitized Form 990s provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) of the Urban Institute and searched the name of Wisconsin teacher unions, as they appear in the records of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (available at `https://werc.wi.gov/`). We were able to link 99 districts to the records of 52 unions. For our analysis, we compute revenues per teacher dividing total revenues (primarily from membership dues) by the total number of teachers in the districts represented by each union; we obtained the latter from the Staff Files of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.

In Figure F.9, we estimate equation (7) of the paper separately for districts in CZs with and without an inequality shock, additionally controlling for each district's share of teachers in each experience group.

Figure F.1
Distribution of Contributions to State and Regional PACs

Panel A: Contributions to State PACs



Panel B: Contributions to Regional PACs



Notes. The figure shows the distribution of annual donations to state political action committees (PACs, panel A) and regional PACs (panel B) in Wisconsin by public-school teachers between 2016 and 2020, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV.

Figure F.2
Distribution of Wards and Districts by CBA Expiration Dates



Notes. The figure plots the share of school districts by the year in which their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) expired, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV.

Figure F.3
Labor Market Concentration Across Wisconsin School Districts and Commuting Zones



Notes. The map plots the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) in teacher employment concentration in 2010, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. The HHI is calculated for each commuting zone using the distribution of teachers across school districts within the CZ, with higher values indicating greater concentration. Red lines denote commuting zone boundaries; black lines denote school district boundaries.

Figure F.4

Wage Inequality Shocks and Teachers' Outside Options: Teacher Sorting Out of Public Schools, Across Districts, and Across Commuting

PANEL A: Teacher Exit From Public Schools



PANEL B: Teacher Sorting Between Shock and No-Shock Districts



PANEL C: Teacher Sorting Between Shock and No-Shock CZs



Notes. This figure explores whether teachers' outside options—captured by exit from public schools and their mobility between commuting zones or districts—change over time in districts that did and did not experience a rise in inequality, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from a modified version of equation (7)—instead of revenue, we regress indicators for *teachers exiting public schools* (panel A), *teachers in a district moving to a different district* (panel B), and *teachers in a district moving to a different CZ* (Panel C) on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year fixed effects. To capture changes in outside options, in panel A we focus on workers younger than 55, the minimum retirement age for public school teachers in Wisconsin. Blue series refer to districts with a commuting zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median, while orange series refer to districts with an HHI above the median. Coefficients are displayed with 95% confidence intervals and using standard errors clustered at the district level.

Figure F.5
Wage Inequality and Labor Market Concentration, By Quartiles of The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

PANEL A: Standard Deviation of Within-Position Salaries, 2010



PANEL B: Change in Standard Deviation of Within-Position Salaries, 2010-16



Notes. This figure shows how the within-position standard deviation of salaries changed after Act 10 relative to before, by quartile of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Each bar corresponds to the coefficient on a dummy for each quartile in a regression with the 2010 standard deviation of within-position salaries (panel A) and the 2010-2016 change in the same variable (panel B). We classify districts in each quartile based on the distribution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in their commuting zone. Observations are weighted by the number of workers. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals, using robust standard errors.

Figure F.6
Wage Inequality Shocks and Union Revenues - Robustness to Negative Weights



Notes. This figure replicates Figure VI implementing the estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021), robust to the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects across cohorts correlated with the timing of the treatment. It shows how wage inequality affects union revenues at the school district level, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from equation (7), which regresses log union revenues per teacher on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year fixed effects. We obtain and display separate coefficients for districts with a commuting zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median (blue series) and for those with an HHI above the median (orange series). We end our analysis one/two years after a CBA expiration to maintain a set of never-treated districts in each group. Observations are weighted by the number of workers. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the district level.

Figure F.7
Wage Inequality Shocks and Union Revenues - Difference Between Shock and No-Shock Districts



Notes. This figure shows differences in the estimates of coefficients β_k from equation (7), between low and high HHI districts. Estimates are obtained regressing log annual union revenues per teacher on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year-by-shock fixed effects, pooling data for districts with a commuting zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below and above the state median and further interacting the term $\mathbb{1}(t-E_{d(j)}=k)$ with indicators for an HHI below the state median. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the district level.

Figure F.8
Wisconsin Results Controlling for Baseline Population and Political Characteristics

(a) Wage Inequality Over Time



(b) Union Revenues Over Time



(c) Union Membership



Notes: This figure replicates the main results from the Wisconsin study while controlling for baseline district population and political characteristics. Panels A and B interact log 2010 district population and the Republican vote share in the 2012 presidential election with year indicators. Panel A shows estimates from regressions of the average within-position standard deviation of salaries in each district and year on event-year indicators, relative to the expiration of collective bargaining agreements, with district and year fixed effects. Panel B reports analogous estimates for log annual union revenues per teacher. The blue and orange series report separate estimates for districts in the concentration of public-school teacher employment across districts within commuting zones. Panel C replicates the individual-level union-membership analysis while controlling directly for log 2010 district population and the 2012 Republican vote share. The membership regressions also control for the other displayed teacher characteristics and year fixed effects. Estimates in Panels A and B are displayed with 95 percent confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the district level. Panel A weights observations by the number of teachers. Estimates in Panel C are displayed with 95 percent confidence intervals using robust standard errors; reported p-values test equality of the coefficients within each pair.

Figure F.9
Wage Inequality Shocks and Union Revenues - Controlling for Shares of Teachers in Each Position



Notes. This figure replicates Figure VI while additionally controlling for the distribution of teacher positions in each district. It shows how wage inequality affects union revenues at the school district level, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from equation (7), which regresses log union revenues per teacher on event-year dummies (relative to expiration of collective bargaining agreements) with district and year fixed effects. We obtain and display separate coefficients for districts with a commuting zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median (blue series) and for those with an HHI above the median (orange series). Observations are weighted by the number of workers. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the district level. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

Figure F.10
Union Revenues by Quartiles of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index



Notes. This figure replicates Figure VI by pooling together years before and after a CBA expiration and by splitting districts according to the quartile of their commuting zone-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. It shows how wage inequality affects union revenues at the school district level, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Estimates represent coefficients β_k from equation (7), constrained to be zero for $k \leq 0$ and constant for $k > 0$, and obtained by regressing log union revenues per teacher on an indicator for years after a CBA expiration, with district and year fixed effects. We obtain and display separate coefficients for districts in different quartiles of their commuting zone Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Observations are weighted by the number of workers. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals, using standard errors clustered at the district level.

Figure F.11
Wage Inequality and Union Membership, by Size of The Wage Gains



Notes. This figure explores heterogeneity in the effect of wage inequality on union membership at the teacher level by size of each teacher's wage gain, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Coefficients show the effect on union membership of working in districts with a commuting zone level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median relative to districts above the median. Respondents are grouped by whether they have wage gains below the 25th percentile, between the 25th and 50th, between the 50th and 75th, and above the 75th, within their district. Wage gains are defined as 2010-2016 changes in salaries. Each regression is estimated using membership data for 2016/17 and controls for having experience above the median and for gender. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using robust standard errors, and p-values testing for whether the coefficient is different from zero are printed next to the point estimates.

Table F.1
Wage Inequality and Labor Market Concentration

	Std. dev., 2010	Change in std.dev, 2010-2016
	(1)	(2)
Low HHI	-147.04	2896.42**
	(714.86)	(1455.42)
Mean dep. var. control	4242.42	-249.67
N (districts)	416	416

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates on the relationship between actual wage inequality and labor market concentration, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. The dependent variables are the standard deviation of wages within position in 2010, averaged at the district level (Column 1), and the change in this variable between 2010 and 2016 (Column 2). The independent variable *Low HHI* equals one for districts in commuting zones with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median. Positions are defined by district, education, and three-year experience bins. Each observation corresponds to a district and is weighted by the total number of workers. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table F.2
District Characteristics and Labor Market Concentration

Panel (a)	2007-10 change		2010		2016	
	Salary	Benefits	Salary	Benefits	Salary	Benefits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low HHI	2910.37	723.73	1750.89	546.11	-224.85	258.58
	(2013.45)	(1144.04)	(1985.60)	(728.14)	(281.32)	(815.36)
Mean dep. var. control	7889.43	4764.47	52480.31	22586.07	50935.78	23086.52
N (districts)	416	416	416	416	416	416

Panel (b)	2010			2016		
	Experience	Master's	Female	Experience	Master's	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low HHI	0.192	-0.018	-0.010	-1.337	-0.020	-0.008
	(0.390)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(1.323)	(0.024)	(0.006)
Mean dep. var. control	12.48	0.50	0.73	14.14	0.41	0.74
N (districts)	416	416	416	416	416	416

Panel (c)	City	Town	Suburb	Rural	ln(Popul)	Share GOP votes, 2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low HHI	0.080	-0.056	0.012	-0.037	0.323	0.044
	(0.145)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.061)	(0.517)	(0.033)
Mean dep. var. control	0.03	0.25	0.11	0.61	8.82	0.46
N (districts)	416	416	416	416	416	416

Notes. This table examines whether labor market concentration is systematically related to observable district characteristics, from the Wisconsin study described in Section IV. Each column reports the OLS estimate of a district characteristic on an indicator for districts in commuting zones with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the state median. In Panel (a), the dependent variables are average 2007-2010 within-worker changes in salaries and benefits (health care, pension, and life insurance contributions made by the employer, Columns 1-2); average district salaries and benefits conditional on position in 2010 (Columns 3-4); and average district salaries and benefits conditional on position in 2016 (Columns 5-6). In Panel (b), the dependent variables are average teacher experience, share with Master's, and share female in 2010 (Columns 1-3), and the same variables measured in 2016 (Columns 4-6). In Panel (c), the dependent variables are indicators for districts located in a city (Column 1), town (Column 2), suburb (Column 3), or rural area (Column 4); log population (Column 5); and the share of votes for the GOP in the 2012 presidential election at the county level (Column 6). Each observation corresponds to a district and is weighted by the number of workers. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table F.3
Inference with District vs. Commuting-Zone Clustering

	District clusters	CZ wild-*t* bootstrap
First stage		
Low HHI, t+2	<0.001	0.055
Low HHI, t+3	<0.001	0.057
High HHI, t+2	<0.001	0.011
High HHI, t+3	0.193	0.270
First stage by HHI quartile		
HHI quartile 4	0.471	0.479
HHI quartile 3	0.475	0.380
HHI quartile 2	<0.001	0.087
HHI quartile 1	0.039	0.117
Union revenues		
Low HHI, t+2	<0.001	0.860
Low HHI, t+3	<0.001	0.925
High HHI, t+2	0.018	0.412
High HHI, t+3	<0.001	0.463
Union revenues by HHI quartile		
HHI quartile 4	0.838	0.863
HHI quartile 3	0.549	0.700
HHI quartile 2	0.092	0.091
HHI quartile 1	0.006	0.283
Union membership		
Above vs. below median wage gain	0.022	0.060
Above vs. below median tenure	0.826	0.847
Male vs. female	0.726	0.689
Bootstrap clustering level		Commuting zone
Bootstrap weights		Webb
Bootstrap replications		999

Notes. This table reports two-sided *p*-values for the indicated tests. The first column uses standard errors clustered by school district. The second column uses wild-*t* bootstrap inference clustered by commuting zone (CZ), based on Webb weights and 999 bootstrap replications. There are 19 commuting-zone clusters. *HHI* denotes the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, a measures the concentration of public-school teacher employment across districts within commuting zones. *Low-HHI* refers to districts in commuting zones with HHI below the state median.

G Additional Details on Study III: Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Inequality in Union Support

G.1 Additional Recruitment and Sample Details

Appendix Table G.1 reports characteristics of both our contact list and respondents. Using individual data from IMDb (IMDb, 2023), we link 4,373 WGA contacts to an IMDb profile, or 83% of the 5,244 total contacts (Column (1)). In Columns (2), we compare them to the 334 survey respondents we can also link to IMDb (84% of 400 complete responses) on observable characteristics. We report each individual's earliest credit year, total credits, and a breakdown of credit characteristics.

We additionally report the gender breakdown of contacts and respondents. Although respondents self-report their gender at the end of the survey, to classify the gender of contacts, we use data from the U.S. Social Security Administration which reports gender distributions of first names following Adukia et al. (2023). We analyze first names given to individuals born between 1920 and 2010, classifying a name as female if women comprise more than 50% of all people with that name during this period. We are able to classify the first names of 97% of contacts.

G.2 Additional Results

G.2.1 Demand and Uses for a Pay Report

In our baseline survey, we present respondents with an example of what a pay report could look like (Appendix Figure G.3). We display two types of such "example" reports: one showing aggregate pay distributions and one showing pay distributions split by gender. We randomize which example respondents see first. Results in this section focus on the aggregate report, and we discuss robustness to randomization order and focusing on the gender-split report (Appendix Section G.2.2).

Survey Questions We describe the information contained in a pay report as revealing the distribution of pay rates (Appendix Figure G.3, and then we ask, on a 5-point scale: "Do you think we should create such a report?" We align the respondents' incentive to answer truthfully by reminding them that we would use their responses to decide whether to produce and circulate such a report.[10] We also measure willingness

[10]We consider "Yes, I would value it significantly" or "Yes, I would be interested to see it" as affirmative interest when we report a binary measure of this question. The incentive compatible language states: "We are considering producing a

to pay (WTP) for the report following the incentive-compatible BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964). We ask respondents to decide on 5 binary options between receiving the pay report and a financial reward, stating that we will randomly select a preferred option to fulfill for 10 participants if the report is produced. The 5 choices are between the pay report and $25, $150, $500, $2,000, and $6,000. We set WTP inside each bin to the bin's mid-point and set the top bin to $6,000, following Andersen et al. (2006).

After eliciting interest in the report, we ask respondents: "How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply." This question is intended to investigate how pay information might impact respondents' actions. We present five potential uses (e.g., contract negotiation, labor organizing) and allow for write-ins.

Results Figure G.4 Panel A documents high demand for pay transparency: 87% of respondents express interest in a pay report (left panel), with an average WTP of $937 (right panel). Specifically, 32% are not willing to pay more than $25 and 52% are not willing to pay more than $150, while 27% are willing to pay $500 or more. This heterogeneity is consistent with pay information being high-value for some respondents (e.g., those expecting to negotiate soon) but not others. In prior work, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2022) find that one quarter of workers are willing to pay more than one week's earnings for information about their co-workers' pay. Panel C shows how respondents declare they would use the pay report. After informational reasons (80% would use the report "to know where they stand in the pay distribution"), the second most common answer is individual negotiation: 70% would use the report to negotiate their future contract (and 22% would use it to renegotiate their current contract). Only 33% would use it for labor organizing. In other words, writers are interested in their relative standing and to have data to improve their individual negotiations.

G.2.2 Robustness

We examine several alternate measures of these results, building on our baseline measures from Figure G.4. First, we document similar interest in the combined pay report only among WGA members who saw the combined pay report before the gender-split pay report (Appendix Figure G.5). Second, we show our measures of interest for the gender-split report (Appendix Figure G.6). There is little difference in

report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse. We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report."

demand for the overall and split pay reports, with 84% of respondents indicating interest in the split pay report and 87% indicating interest in the overall report.

Third, we show interest in a pay report among the full sample of survey respondents. So far, we focus on responses from WGA members given the high-stakes nature of the institutional context. However, we also recruited non-WGA writers as well as both members of the Directors Guild of America (DGA)—which represents 19,000 directors and members of the directorial team working in media such as film, television, news, and commercials (Sakoui, 2023)—and non-DGA directors. The DGA contract was up for renegotiation around the same time as the WGA's, and they reached a tentative agreement on June 3 that members ratified on June 23 (DGA, 2023). Our full contact list contained 19,916 writers and/or directors (our "contacts"). We received 1,048 complete responses in total, or 5.3% of all contacts, with 9.0% completing some fraction of the survey. The results are quantitatively very similar to the WGA-only sample: 83% value the report, with a median WTP of $1,008. In this sample, there is slightly more willingness to petition, as shown in Appendix Figure G.7.

G.3 Recruitment Materials

We sent the following email for baseline survey recruitment starting on June 15, 2023:

Dear [first name],

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse.

We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report. Your responses will remain confidential, unless you indicate otherwise when prompted during the survey.

If you would like to participate, please continue (accessible on mobile) here.

You can alternatively participate by copy-pasting the URL: [link]

We then sent the following recruitment email to writers on August 11, 2023 for the follow-up sur-

vey:

Dear [first name],

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. Thank you to those who completed our initial survey on pay in the screenwriting and TV writing industry.

As promised, we are following up with you to share our results and ask one question. Your participation is fully confidential.

If you'd like to see our results, please continue (accessible on mobile) here. You can also view by copy-pasting the URL to the Harvard Qualtrics platform: [link]

Table G.1
Contact and Respondent Characteristics

	Baseline Survey		Follow-up Survey	
	(1) Contacts	(2) Respondents	(3) Contacts	(4) Respondents
% Male	64.3	63.9	63.5	57.5
	(0.7)	(2.6)	(0.8)	(3.1)
Earliest Credit Year	2005	2007	2005	2007
	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Total Credits	38.8	39.3	40.3	38.9
	(1.3)	(7.0)	(1.5)	(6.9)
Credit Type				
% Writing	79.7	83.2	81.2	80.0
	(0.5)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(1.9)
% Directing	12.0	9.0	10.8	12.5
	(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(1.6)
% Producing	8.3	7.8	8.0	7.5
	(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.3)	(1.1)
Credit Medium				
% TV	80.5	83.6	83.1	82.5
	(0.5)	(1.6)	(0.5)	(1.8)
% Movie	11.5	7.5	9.8	7.5
	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.3)	(1.1)
Credit Genre				
% Drama	50.9	53.4	52.1	52.4
	(0.6)	(2.2)	(0.6)	(2.5)
% Comedy	45.4	44.4	46.5	46.8
	(0.6)	(2.3)	(0.7)	(2.6)
Total Individuals	5,244	400	4,716	310
Individuals with Credit Data	4,376	335	3,935	261

Notes. This table summarizes characteristics of Writers Guild of America (WGA) members contacted for the baseline and follow-up surveys, as well as those who responded, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Columns (1)–(2) describe the baseline survey, while Columns (3)–(4) describe the follow-up. Data come from IMDb (2023). Statistics are restricted to individuals successfully linked to the IMDb data. *Total Individuals* reports the total population in each group. *Individuals with Credit Data* indicates how many of them are matched to IMDb data, have complete IMDb information, and have first names that allow gender classification using Social Security Administration data. To obtain *% Male*, we classify first names from the contact list by gender. *Credit Type* breaks down the types of credits (writing, directing, producing), which are not mutually exclusive on a given project. *Credit Medium* shows percentages of credits in television and film, which together compose 87% of all titles in the dataset. *Credit Genre* shows percentages of credits in the two most common genres: drama and comedy.

Figure G.1
Own Pay vs. Prediction of Typical Pay



Notes. This figure plots a binscatter of the relationship between a writer's self-reported percent above scale and their prediction of the typical percent above scale for other writers in similar positions, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure G.2
Heterogeneity in Perception of WGA Demands with Position Fixed Effects



Notes. This figure explores heterogeneity in the effect of the pay report on writers' perceptions of the WGA's demands, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. We replicate Figure X, adding position fixed effects (measured by most recent IMDb credit title). Coefficients report the effect of having seen the pay report on answers to the question "Do most writers think the WGA demands will meet the needs of all WGA members?", using the 1-5 scale shown in Figure IX (1 = Not at all, 5 = Almost entirely). The sample is 251 WGA members with available credit, experience, and gender data. Respondents are grouped by three characteristics: (1) *Above Median Credits* vs. *Below Median Credits* based on median IMDb credits among individuals from our WGA contact list with the same most recent credit title (e.g., "Story Editor"); (2) *Above Median Tenure* vs. *Below Median Tenure*, based on median years since first IMDb credit among individuals from our WGA contact list with the same most recent credit title; (3) *Male* vs. *Female*, self-reported or otherwise imputed based on first names as described in Section G.1. Each regression controls for the other two characteristics, out of the three, that are not being tested. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals, using robust standard errors. We test the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal across groups and report the difference-in-difference p-values to the right of the plot.

Figure G.3
Proposed Reports

PANEL A: (Mock) Overall Report



PANEL B: (Mock) Split Pay Report

Notes. This figure shows the mock report we included in the baseline survey as an example of what information respondents may receive in the followup, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. This version was shown to film writers; we showed analogous versions to TV writers. The survey included a disclaimer that these reports were made using fake data. For full survey details, see Appendix H.2.

Figure G.4
Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report



Notes. This figure summarizes writers' interest in and demand for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay, elicited using the incentive-compatible BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964). Panel B shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Networks. Panel C shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report; respondents are allowed to select multiple uses. Estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure G.5
Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report Among Those Who Saw the Overall Pay Report First



Notes. This figure replicates Figure G.4, restricting to 199 respondents who see the (mock) overall pay report before the (mock) gender-split report. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Networks. Panel C shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure G.6
Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Gender-Split Pay Report



Notes. This figure replicates Figure G.4 using questions regarding the gender-split report. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Networks. Panel C shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals. Sample size is 400 WGA members.

Figure G.7
Baseline Hollywood Survey: Interest in a Pay Report Among All Writers and Directors



Notes. This figure replicates Figure G.4, expanding the sample to all complete responses, including writers and directors, WGA members and non-WGA members. It summarizes writers' interests and demands for a pay report, from the Hollywood experiment described in Section V. Panel A shows the share of respondents interested in receiving a pay report and their average willingness to pay. Panel B shows the share of respondents willing to publicly petition for pay data from either the WGA or the Networks. Panel C shows respondents' intended uses for a pay report, allowing multiple selections. Estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals. Sample size is 1,048 respondents.

H Survey Instruments

H.1 Organizer Survey Instrument

Introduction

We are a team of professors studying worker bargaining power. We want to better understand the barriers organizers are facing to unionizing. We are sending this survey to top organizers and former organizers across the U.S. and Canada.

If you decide to participate, we will share with you our aggregated results so you can access insights on strategies used by other unions.

All individual responses will remain anonymous.

This survey takes 10 minutes. As a token of appreciation, we will transfer you $30 (as a gift card).

You can only take this survey once.

Here are more details about the study:

Research details:

- Purpose and procedures: You are being invited to participate in a research survey that seeks to understand the factors that facilitate union organizing. The survey takes about 10 minutes to complete.
- Compensation: You will receive a $30 USD gift card, which will be delivered to you within 10 days of completing the survey.

Confidentiality: Your participation is voluntary. Subjects may decline to answer any or all questions and may decline further participation, at any time, without adverse consequences. Identifiable data linking you to your response (i.e., your email) will be kept in a secure server and will not be made available to anyone other than the researcher. Your email will only be retained for payment purposes and will be deleted following confirmation of payment. De-identified data (meaning that it contains no identifying information about you) may be shared with academic journals as part of their open access policies.

Who to contact with questions or concerns:

Nina Roussille
nroussil@mit.edu

If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects at MIT at couhes@mit.edu.

Do you consent to participate?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Eligibility

Q1

Are you, or have you ever been, a union organizer in any capacity?

◯ I am currently an organizer

◯ I have been an organizer in the past but am not currently one

◯ No, I have never been a union organizer

Q2

Condition: Are you, or have you ever been, a union organizer in any capacity? = No, I have never been a union organizer

Are you sure? For the purposes of this study, a union organizer is anyone who has been involved in an effort to organize a workplace or participated in contract renegotiations at a unionized workplace.

◯ I am currently an organizer

◯ I have been an organizer in the past but am not currently one

◯ No, I have never been a union organizer

Vignettes

We are now going to present you with two different hypothetical scenarios. After each scenario, we will ask you a few questions about organizing these workplaces.

Each respondent sees Factory A and Factory B in a randomized order. Each block starts with the Factory A or Factory B introduction, as seen below, and continues with a series of questions that are the same between factories.

Factory A Introduction

Hypothetical scenario: You are trying to get support for the creation of a union at Factory A

Some workers are interested in unionizing, and the employer is known to be hostile to organizers.

To investigate, you've done some research on hourly market pay for workers with similar experience. Workers market rates can vary because local demand for certain skill sets can vary, as well as other reasons. In Factory A, all the workers market rates are approximately $48. But, the firm pays them $40. Each assignment makes up one-third of the factory's workers.

The table below shows pay inside and outside the factory.

Assignments	Hourly Wage	Research on Market Wage
Quality control (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Metal Worker (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Pipefitter (1/3rd)	$40	$48

Factory B Introduction

Hypothetical scenario: You are trying to get support for the creation of a union at Factory B

Some workers are interested in unionizing, and the employer is known to be hostile to organizers.

To investigate, you've done some research on hourly market pay for workers with similar experience. Workers market rates can vary because local demand for certain skill sets can vary, as well as other reasons. In Factory B, the workers market rates are varied but everyone is currently paid the same wage. Each assignment makes up one-third of the factory's workers.

The table below shows pay inside and outside the factory.

Assignments	Hourly Wage	Research on Market Wage
Quality Control (1/3rd)	$40	$30
Metal Worker (1/3rd)	$40	$48
Pipefitter (1/3rd)	$40	$66

Q3

In the absence of more information, workers generally think that everyone earns what they do for similar work. You have the option to share the pay data you collected with workers.

Would you share this pay information with workers?

Order of choices randomly flipped

○ Yes, I would publish the pay information **during** the union campaign

◯ Yes, I would publish the pay information **after** the union campaign

◯ No, I would not publish the pay information

Q4

Now assume all the wage data become known to all workers.

What hourly wage increase (in the first year of the new contract) would each of the following groups demand for themselves in order to ratify the CBA?

	+$0 (no increase)	+$2	+$4	+$6	+$8	+$10	+$12	+$14	+$16	+$18	+$20 or more
Quality Control	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Metal Worker	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Pipefitter	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q5

How easy would it be for all workers to agree on pay scale demands?

For instance, this would imply that Metal Workers approve of the pay raises demanded by Pipefitters, and vice versa.

◯ Difficult

◯ Somewhat difficult

◯ Somewhat easy

◯ Easy

Q6

What share of each of the following groups at Factory{A/B} do you think will apply for a job elsewhere during the union campaign?

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Quality Control	▽										
Metal Worker	▽										
Pipefitter	▽										

Q7

What hourly wage increase (in the first year of the new contract) could you reasonably expect the employer to agree on?

	+$0 (no increase)	+$2	+$4	+$6	+$8	+$10	+$12	+$14	+$16	+$18	+$20 or more
Quality Control	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Metal Worker	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Pipefitter	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q8

Please share your best guess: After all the details are hammered out, what percent of workers at Factory {A/B} would you expect to pro-actively vote yes to ratify a contract?

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of Workers	▽										

Q9

At this factory, the employer does not provide the workers with predictable hours.

The employer also has thus far refused to sign the Open to All business pledge: a commitment to maintaining a welcoming and safe environment for people — including team members, visitors, customers, vendors and clients — regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, immigration.

To maximize support for the union, which of the following issues would be better to focus on during the campaign?

Options presented in a randomized order

◯ Raising pay

◯ Guaranteed predictable hours

◯ Signing the Open to All pledge (a commitment to maintaining a welcoming and safe environment)

Q10

Would you advise separate bargaining units for these three groups of workers?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Factory Comparison

Q11

With limited resources, which factory would you attempt to organize?

We will direct a significant donation to an organization (not participating in this survey) focused on organizing a workplace closest to Factory A or Factory B, based on the answers we receive.

◯ Factory A

◯ Factory B

Q12

You told us that you would attempt to organize Factory{Q11 ANSWER} before{Q11 UNSELECTED}.
Could you explain your reasoning?

_____
_____
_____

Q13

When asked what you would prioritize (Raising pay, Guaranteed predictable hours, or Signing the Open to All pledge), you told us you would prioritize{Q9 ANSWER, FACTORY A} at A and{Q9 ANSWER, FACTORY B} at B.
Could you explain your reasoning?

_____
_____
_____

Descriptive Questions

Q14

Do you agree with this statement? One central reason workers seek out unions is for greater pay transparency

- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Somewhat agree
- ◯ Somewhat disagree
- ◯ Disagree

Q15

Consider the workplace that you are currently organizing or most recently organized.
Which of the following best describes that organizing effort?

- ◯ Organizing a new union
- ◯ Organizing an existing union

Q16

What was the year in which you most recently tried to organize a workplace?
Choice: FROM Before 1990, 1990 ... TO 2023, 2024

Q17

What was the industry?
Choice: NAICS 2-digit industries descriptions (e.g., Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, Retail Trade)

Condition: Text depends on{*Q1 ANSWER*} *and*{*Q18 ANSWER*}
For the following questions, please consider the{workplace/union} you{currently organize/most recently organized}.

Order of the following 2 sections randomized

Worker Priority

Q18

When thinking about the amenities of the job in the workplace you currently organize or most recently organized, how important was pay to workers?
If helpful, you can think back to any worker survey you ran at the time.

- ◯ The top priority
- ◯ A secondary priority
- ◯ A tertiary priority
- ◯ Not in the top 3 priorities

Campaign Descriptives

Q19

What were the **three main issues** the union focused on during the campaign?

- ◯ Union Recognition
- ◯ Health and Safety/PPE
- ◯ Forced Overtime
- ◯ Wages
- ◯ Respect and Dignity
- ◯ Fairness
- ◯ Health Insurance
- ◯ Pensions

- ◯ Discrimination
- ◯ Too many hours
- ◯ Not enough hours
- ◯ Working Conditions
- ◯ Power
- ◯ Representation
- ◯ Just Cause
- ◯ Grievance
- ◯ Scheduling
- ◯ Contract
- ◯ Service and Product Quality
- ◯ Job Security
- ◯ Staffing
- ◯ Training
- ◯ Technological Change
- ◯ Surveillance
- ◯ Sexual Harassment
- ◯ Broken Promises
- ◯ Employer Behavior
- ◯ Paid Time Off
- ◯ Paid Leave
- ◯ Childcare
- ◯ Pay Transparency
- ◯ Immigrant Rights
- ◯ Promotional Opportunity
- ◯ Voice
- ◯ Tuition
- ◯ Other: _____

Q20

Please rank three main issues you selected from most important (1) to least important (3).
Choices: Issues selected in{*Q19*}

Q21

Condition: Text depends on{*Q15 ANSWER*}

Did you collect pay information relevant to{workers/union members}?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Q22

Condition:{*Q21 ANSWER*} = *Yes*

How do you access pay information?
This could be information about the pay of{workers/union members} or those at similar establishments.

_____

_____

_____

Q23

Condition:{*Q21 ANSWER*} = *Yes*

Did you publish all the anonymized pay data you collected? (eg. report in a newsletter, publish on website, membership-wide email)

◯ Yes

◯ No

Q24

What (if any) pay information did you communicate?

_____

_____

_____

Q25

How many years have you worked as an organizer?
Choice: FROM Less than 1 year, 1 year ... TO 9 years, 10+ years

Q26

Do you have experience as the lead organizer on a campaign?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Q27

Which country do you have more experience working in?

◯ U.S.

◯ Canada

Conclusion

Q28

Please share any feedback, comments, or questions here, or let us know if anything in the survey was unclear.

_____

_____

_____

H.2 Hollywood Survey Instrument

Introduction

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse.

We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released unless you indicate otherwise.

By clicking "Yes" below, you consent to participate in the survey.

Do you want to participate?

Here is some key information about the study:

- We are asking you to take part in a research study because you might be a writer or director, or part of the directing team.
- If you agree to be in this study you will be asked to complete a 10-minute online survey.
- We don't believe there are any risks from participating in this research. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released. The study would only use aggregate data.

- We cannot promise any benefits to others from your taking part in this research. However, possible benefits to you include helpful career information.
- Your participation is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate, or you can agree to participate and change your mind later and your decision will not be held against you. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.
- The identified data collected in this survey and IMDb will be exclusively shared among the co-PIs on the study team.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC[11] Office of Research Ethics at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail RSIL@ors.ubc.ca or call toll free 1-877-822-8598. Taking part in this survey is entirely up to you. If you decide to take part, you may choose to stop filling the survey at any time.

◯ Yes, I want to participate

Introductory Questions

First, we have some questions to determine which report would be most relevant for you.

Q1

Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply.

□ Writer

□ Director or Directing Team

□ Producer

□ Actor

□ Other

Q2

Do you primarily work in TV or film?

◯ TV

◯ Film

[11] A previous co-author was at UBC hence the UBC IRB language here and in survey recruitment messaging.

Q3

Which type of studio provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Streaming service
- ◯ Traditional studio

Q4

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income?

- ◯ Director
- ◯ Unit Production Manager
- ◯ First Assistant Director
- ◯ Key Second Assistant Director
- ◯ 2nd Second Assistant Director
- ◯ Additional Second Assistant Director
- ◯ Associate Director

Q5

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income?

- ◯ Staff Writer
- ◯ Story Editor
- ◯ Executive Story Editor
- ◯ Co-producer
- ◯ Producer
- ◯ Co-executive Producer
- ◯ Showrunner

Q6

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of pay structure for TV writing provides a more important source of income for you?

◯ Weekly

◯ Episodic

Q7

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = Film
And Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Which type of film provides a more important source of income for you?

◯ Low budget

◯ High budget

Block:{Film Writer/TV Writer/Director}

Conditional on{Q1 ANSWER} and{Q2 ANSWER} there will be different phrasing of the questions based on position,{Film Writer/TV Writer/Director}, and some additional questions for TV Writers and Directors.

As an example, questions Q8-Q27 are phrased in this sample for Film Writers (also referred to as screenwriters), but there were analogous versions for TV writers and directors.

For Film Writers, we use{Q7 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.
For TV Writers, we use a combination of{Q5 ANSWER} and{Q6 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.
For Directors, we use{Q4 ANSWER} for questions about earnings.

We randomize the order in which the two pay reports (overall vs. split) are displayed. This means half of the sample see questions Q8-Q13 and EQ1-EQ2 first (about the overall report) followed by Q14-Q17 and EQ3-EQ4 (about the split report), and the other half see the opposite order.

Q8

We will ask you about two reports. Please consider the proposed report showing earnings in the screenwriting industry based on screenwriter contracts in the past year.
Here is an example of what we would report about screenwriters:

WGA-Member
Compensation Relative to MBA Minimums for{Q7 ANSWER} Screenplays at{Q3 ANSWER}s (2023)



(Note: this example uses fake data.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report would be shared with other screenwriters, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. Your response will be strictly confidential.

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q9

Instead of creating a report, we could use the same resources to transfer rewards to survey respondents.

Below, we will ask you about 5 hypothetical scenarios. In each scenario, you will be presented a choice between accessing the report on pay OR receiving money.

We will randomly choose 10 survey respondents. If you are one of these 10 lucky respondents, we will randomly select one of your 5 choices to send to you if the report is produced.

As a result, it is in your best interest to respond honestly to these scenarios. Please make your choices below, and at the end of the survey you will find out if you are selected.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	◯	◯

Q10

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- □ To decide where to work
- □ To negotiate new contracts
- □ To re-negotiate existing contracts
- □ For labor organizing
- □ I wouldn't use it
- □ Other

Q11

Condition: If How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not incl... = I wouldn't use it

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ I already can access the information about pay that I need
- □ Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- □ The proposed report is missing crucial information (e.g., demographics)
- □ Other

Q12

Condition: randomized treatment – half of the sample see a question about Guild, half of the sample see a question about Networks

You previously said{Q8 ANSWER} about a report on overall screenwriter pay distributions.

We are considering sending a petition to the{Guild/Networks} that would ask for the data they have on pay to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on overall pay.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Q13

Condition:{Q12 ANSWER} = No

What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

_____

_____

_____

EQ1 (TV Writers Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce a report for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q5 ANSWER}s. But we could produce a similar report for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Staff Writer

☐ Staff writers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Story Editor

☐ Story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Executive Story Editor

☐ Executive story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-producer

□ Co-producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Producer

□ Producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-executive Producer

□ Co-executive producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Showrunner

□ Showrunners

EQ2 (Directors Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce a report for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q4 ANSWER}s. But we could produce a similar report for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of the directing team should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Director

□ Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Unit Production Manager

□ Unit Production Managers

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != First Assistant Director

□ First Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Key Second Assistant Director

□ Key Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != 2nd Second Assistant Director

□ 2nd Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Additional Second Assistant Director

□ Additional Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Associate Director

□ Associate Directors

Q14

We would like to ask you the same questions about one alternative report.

We can create a different report displaying pay distributions separately for each gender, using the same data on recent contracts.

Here is an example of what we would report about screenwriters:

WGA-Member
Compensation Relative to MBA Minimums for{Q7 ANSWER} Screenplays at{Q3 ANSWER}s (2023)

(Note: this example uses fake data for each graph. To preserve anonymity, we would include non-binary individuals in both distributions.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report would be shared with other screenwriters, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. Your response will be strictly confidential.

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q15

Below you are presented with 5 more hypothetical scenarios, now about the pay disparities report.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	◯	◯
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	◯	◯

Q16

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- □ To decide where to work
- □ To negotiate new contracts
- □ To re-negotiate existing contracts
- □ For labor organizing
- □ I wouldn't use it
- □ Other

Q17

Condition: If How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not incl... = I wouldn't use it

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

Options presented in a randomized order

- □ I already can access the information about pay that I need
- □ Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- □ The proposed report is missing crucial information
- □ It would detract from the purpose of collective bargaining
- □ Other

EQ3 (TV Writers Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce this report on pay disparities for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q5 ANSWER}. But we could produce a similar report on pay disparities for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Staff Writer

☐ Staff writers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Story Editor

☐ Story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Executive Story Editor

☐ Executive story editors

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-producer

☐ Co-producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Producer

☐ Producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Co-executive Producer

☐ Co-executive producers

Condition: If Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income? != Showrunner

☐ Showrunners

EQ4 (Directors Only)

Condition: only shown one of two bracketed questions

{Which of the position titles below should we produce this report on pay disparities for? So far we have considered gathering data on{Q4 ANSWER}. But we could produce a similar report on pay disparities for any of the other positions listed below, and we are trying to decide which of these positions the report should cover. The report would be accessible to all. We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

OR

{Which other groups of the directing team should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings? We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create.}

Select all that apply.

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Director

□ Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Unit Production Manager

□ Unit Production Managers

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != First Assistant Director

□ First Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Key Second Assistant Director

□ Key Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != 2nd Second Assistant Director

□ 2nd Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Additional Second Assistant Director

□ Additional Second Assistant Directors

Condition: If Which type of directing job is most relevant for your income? != Associate Director

□ Associate Directors

Q18

Condition: randomized treatment – half of the sample see a question about Guild, half of the sample see a question about Networks

You previously said{Q14 ANSWER} about a report on screenwriter pay distributions by gender.

We are considering sending a petition to the{Guild/Networks} that would ask for the data they have on pay to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on pay disparities.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

◯ Yes

◯ No

Q19

Condition:{*Q18 ANSWER*} = *No*

What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

_____

_____

_____

Q20

What do you think is the most relevant MBA minimum for a typical screenwriter in the Guild writing {Q7 ANSWER} films at{Q3 ANSWER}s in the first half of 2023, in dollars?

$ _____

Q21

What percent above the MBA minimum do you think a typical screenwriter in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films earns at a{Q3 ANSWER} for one script in the first half of 2023?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Choice: FROM Less than the minimum, 0% more (at the minimum), 1% more, ... TO 100% more

Q22

During your most recent project, do you think you earned a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as the typical screenwriter in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working at a{Q3 ANSWER}?

- ◯ Higher
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Lower

Q23

How confident are you in your knowledge of what the typical screenwriter writing for{Q3 ANSWER} in the Guild earns?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Q24

What percent above the MBA minimum do you typically earn writing{Q7 ANSWER} films at{Q3 ANSWER}s for one script in 2023?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Choice: FROM Less than the minimum, 0% more (at the minimum), 1% more, ... TO 100% more

Q25

Among screenwriters in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working at{Q3 ANSWER}s, do you think women earn a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as men?

- ◯ Higher
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Lower

Q26

Condition: If Among screenwriters in the Guild writing{Q7 ANSWER} films working... ={Lower/Higher}

You said that you think that among{Q7 ANSWER} films, women earn a{Lower/Higher} percent above the MBA minimum than men.

What percent more do{men/women} make than{women/men}?

Percent more

Choice: FROM 1% more – TO 100% more or more

Q27

How confident are you in your knowledge of the differences in pay between men and women screenwriters in the Guild?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Concluding Questions

Q28

We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demographics we are considering.

Which, if any, breakdowns would you be interested in seeing? Select all that apply.

- ☐ Gender
- ☐ Race
- ☐ Age
- ☐ LGBTQ+
- ☐ Main genre
- ☐ Networks/streaming services
- ☐ Other
- ☐ None of the above

Q29

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... != None of the above
And Q28 has more than 1 selected options

Please rank the demographics breakdowns you selected above by dragging them from the one you would be most interested in seeing at the top of the list to the one you would be the least interested in seeing at the bottom of the list.

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Gender

- ☐ Gender

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Gender

- ☐ Gender

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Race

- ☐ Race

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Age

□ Age

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = LGBTQ+

□ LGBTQ+

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Main genre

□ Main genre

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Networks/streaming services

□ Networks/streaming services

Condition: If We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g., race. Below is a list of the demo... = Other

□ Other

Q30

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = TV

Out of all the episodes you've worked on in the last year, for what percent did you receive formal credit? (0% = none, 100% = all)

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of episodes						▽					

Q31

Condition: If Do you primarily work in TV or film? = Film

Out of all the films you've worked on in the last year, for what percent did you receive formal credit? (0% = none, 100% = all)

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Percent of films						▽					

Q32

How would a report on true pay distributions by gender compare to the current views of producers & pay-setting executives?

- ◯ It would reveal more pay inequality than they expect
- ◯ It would reveal less pay inequality than they expect
- ◯ It would be the same pay inequality as what they expect

Q33

What is your gender identity?

- ◯ Man
- ◯ Woman
- ◯ Non-binary
- ◯ Other

Q34

How would you describe your race/ethnicity? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Black or African American
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- ☐ White
- ☐ Hispanic/Latino
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Prefer not to disclose

Q35

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writer

Are you a member of the WGA?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q36

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Are you a member of the DGA?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q37

Condition: If Are you a member of the WGA? = Yes

Do you hold an official role in the WGA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, Committee Chair/Vice Chair
- ◯ Yes, Committee Member
- ◯ Yes, Involved but no official position
- ◯ Yes, Prior leadership role
- ◯ Yes, Other

Q38

Condition: If Are you a member of the DGA? = Yes

Do you hold an official role in the DGA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, Committee Chair/Vice Chair
- ◯ Yes, Committee Member
- ◯ Yes, Involved but no official position
- ◯ Yes, Prior leadership role
- ◯ Yes, Other

Q39

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Writers

Is the WGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you?

◯ Yes

◯ No

◯ Not sure

Q40

Condition: If Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply. = Director or Directing Team

Is the DGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you?

◯ Yes

◯ No

◯ Not sure

Q40

Condition: If Is the WGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you? = No
Or Is the DGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you? = No

What information do they collect that would be useful to make available?

_____

_____

_____

Feedback

Thank you for finishing this survey. Please leave any feedback you have here.

_____

_____

_____

Compensation

Would you prefer a $20 Amazon gift card or a donation of your choice as a token of appreciation for your time?

If you select donation, please specify which organization you would like us to donate to.

◯ $20 Amazon gift card

◯ $20 donation

Randomization Outcome

Condition: For participants who were not randomly selected

According to the randomization procedure, any hypothetical questions you answered during this survey will remain hypothetical.

Condition: For 10 randomly selected participants

You have been randomly selected among the 10 participants who will have one of their scenarios implemented. We will be in touch once a determination has been made about the report and no later than July 15th.

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